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SUMMARY OF THE THES I S
This thesis focuses on the spillover effects of US monetary and fiscal policies on
some of its main trading partners. The first chapter examines the cross-border
macroeconomic effects of US monetary policy shocks on Canada and Mexico. To
do this, we depart from the standard two-country VARmodels routinely used in the
literature by adopting a proxy VAR approach. In particular, we employ the first-
stage model averaging method to construct an optimal instrument for US monetary
policy shocks. The main finding of this chapter is that US monetary policy shocks
have a significant impact on Canada’s macroeconomic variables, but not so for
those of Mexico. The second chapter provides a theoretical model of the spillover
effects of monetary policies based on various competing price regimes. It investi-
gates the impact of the US monetary policy on its two neighbours, Canada and
Mexico, under two different pricing regimes: Producer Currency Pricing (PCP);
and Dominant Currency Pricing (DCP). We use a New Keynesian DSGE model
to explain the transmission channels of monetary policy under various pricing sys-
tems. We find that in a Likelihood race, the model with DCP outperforms the
model with PCP. Furthermore, by analysing the variance decomposition of busi-
ness cycle fluctuations, the dominant role of foreign monetary shock in overall
fluctuations is observed. The third chapter focuses on the second wing of the do-
mestic policy which is fiscal policy. Since the recent financial crisis of 2007/08, the
spillover effects of fiscal policies have become increasingly important in the wake
of the zero interest rate lower bound. Using SVARs with external instruments and
data on macroeconomics variables from the UK and Canada, we find that shocks
to the US fiscal policy cause the trade balance in the UK to increase, while they
cause the Canadian dollar to appreciate against the US dollar.
3
I NTRODUCT ION
This thesis consists of three chapters on the international spillovers of US fiscal
and monetary policies on small open economies. These three chapters provide in-
depth discussion on the topic and apply contemporary research methods to provide
answers to the research questions. In the following, we offer an overview summary
of these chapters.
chapter one
The first chapter looks into the spillover of large economies’ domestic monetary
policy on other small open countries. We investigate the impact of shocks to US
monetary policy on macroeconomic variables in Canada and Mexico. We employ
a novel variant of the external instruments method for the identification of shocks
in an "abridged" 2-country structural VAR (SVAR) model. An optimal instrument
is constructed using the first-stage model averaging approach of Kuersteiner and
Okui (2010), which allows for a flexible combination of different proxies for the US
monetary policy shock.
Using monthly data for the period 1979-2012, we find that the US monetary
policy shock has a significant impact on Canada’s real and nominal variables (we
find that a contractionary US MP shock affects significantly macro variables in
Canada, causing Canada’s interest rate, output, and bilateral exchange rate to
rise and inflation to fall), while their effect is not substantial on Mexico’s macro
variables, with the exchange rate playing a role in the transmission of the shocks,
albeit a minor one.
Following Stock and Watson (2018), we use Local Projections IV to compute
impulse responses functions and we compare them to those that resulted from the
SVAR. In a broader sense, both IRFs provide the same conclusion. Finally, a bat-
tery of robustness checks has been implemented which include additional variables
to capture the financial market effects (mortgage spread, credit spread, and stock
prices) as well as an alternative number of lags, alternative policy indicator, and
subsample (2000-2012, 1979-2007) which confirm the main findings.
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chapter two
The second chapter builds a theoretical DSGE model with intermediate goods
to study the spillover of domestic monetary policy of the US on Canada and
Mexico. Following Casas et al. (2017) we construct a small open economy (SOE)
DSGE model interacting with the rest of the world (ROW). Our model, however,
differs from the standard small open economy model in the following important
respects. Firstly, we model two pricing regimes alongside each other: Dominant
currency pricing (DCP) in dollars and producer currency pricing (PCP). Secondly,
our production function uses not only labour but also capital and intermediate
inputs produced at home and abroad, and thirdly, we assume that international
asset markets are incomplete with only riskless bonds being traded, as opposed to
the assumption of complete markets. The main contribution of the paper is that
it explores the empirical evidence for PCP vs DCP pricing paradigms through a
Bayesian estimation likelihood race and a validation comparison with the second
moments of the data.
The main result is that in a likelihood race, DCP outperforms PCP for all coun-
tries with highly significant marginal likelihood differences. In both countries (and
under both prices regimes), the movement of the main macroeconomic variables
goes in the same direction; output, inflation, interest rate, and exchange rate in-
crease; while consumption, investment decrease. The movement of the variables
under PCP has a larger magnitude than those under DCP (with the exception of
consumption in the Canada model).
chapter three
The third chapter studies the influence of fiscal policy measures (i.e. changes in
government spending and tax revenue) in the US on other countries. Specifically,
we analyse the impact of these shocks on key macroeconomic variables in the
UK and Canada. The debate on the cross-border effects of fiscal policy has been
gaining traction in recent decades and especially since the global financial crisis.
This has been driven, at least in part, by the need of many advanced countries to
intensify their use of fiscal policy in face of zero lower bound constraints that limit
the effectiveness of monetary policy.
The results show that the effect of spillover from the US fiscal policy is not
uniform across the two countries, the two shocks types (i.e. shocks to government
spending and the tax revenue), and the various identifying instruments. In general,
shocks to the US fiscal policy (i.e. government spending and tax revenue) causes
the trade balance in the UK to increase while it causes the Canadian dollar to
appreciate versus the US dollar. In addition, the magnitude of the impact is larger
in shocks to the government spending compared to the tax revenue policies.
In case of shocks to the US government spending, local currencies (i.e. the
British pound and the Canadian dollar) appreciate versus the US dollar. While in
the case of shocks to the tax revenue policy, the trade balance in both countries
increases.
1 THE EFFECTS OF US MONETARY
POL ICY ON CANADA AND MEX ICO : A
TALE OF TWO WORLDS?
1.1 introduction
The expansion in international trade and cross-border financial flows in recent
decades has left open economies increasingly exposed to external shocks, as re-
cently demonstrated by the global financial crisis. The ensuing policy responses,
and in particular the actions taken by the Federal Reserve, have brought to the fore
concerns about monetary policy spillovers, with foreign policymakers, particularly
in emerging countries, criticising the Fed’s highly accommodative stance as a de-
liberate attempt to weaken the dollar.1 Given the prominence of the US economy
in driving global financial and economic cycles (see Rey 2016), understanding and
quantifying the importance of the international transmission channels of monetary
spillovers may inform policymakers on how to face the challenges posed by such
policies and to assess the need for international policy coordination.
Though literature abounds in this field, the empirical question about the domes-
tic and international implications of the US monetary policy remains relevant. For
instance, what impact does a contractionary monetary policy in the US have on
business cycles of other countries? Does it improve or make worse financial con-
ditions abroad? Does it aid the flow of capital in or out of the US? Do spillovers
vary across developed and developing countries, or across countries whose curren-
cies are pegged relative to the dollar and those that are not? Available literature
suggests that spillover effects can be sizeable, though considerable heterogeneity
exists across countries in terms of the response of their macroeconomic variables,
asset prices, and financial flows with links between effects and country character-
istics often observed to be vague (see Dedola et al. 2017)
This chapter aims to examine the cross-border macroeconomic effects of US
monetary policy shocks, by estimating the size and sign of this spillover, as well as
the mechanism by which these shocks are transmitted. We focus on Canada and
1 This was compounded by the subsequent “taper tantrum”, caused by expectations of a tightening
in US monetary policy, which led to an increase in the volatility of capital flows to and from
emerging economies.
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Mexico, USA’s closest neighbours, historically its largest trading partners and with
a significant degree of economic and financial interdependence,2 which should allow
us to examine more clearly potential spillover effects. However, both countries
are sufficiently different economic, financial and labour market characteristics, to
provide an interesting contrast and thus relate our results to the existing literature.
We depart from standard two-country VAR models routinely used in the lit-
erature by adopting a proxy VAR approach, whereby external instruments are
used to identify structural shocks, as pioneered by Stock and Watson (2012) and
Mertens and Ravn (2013). In particular, we employ the first-stage model averag-
ing method of Kuersteiner and Okui (2010) to construct an optimal instrument
for US monetary policy shocks. Indeed, the proliferation of proxies for monetary
policy shocks implies that there is a large set of candidate variables that can be
used as instruments (see Georgiadis and Jancokova 2017). The practice in the
literature (e.g. Mertens and Ravn 2013; Gertler and Karadi 2015) has been to
select, in an ad-hoc fashion, a single proxy as an instrument, which may lead to
significant efficiency losses. Moreover, the properties of instrumental variables es-
timators are very sensitive to the choice, and the characteristics, of the instrument
set. Indeed, instruments might be poorly correlated with the endogenous variables,
which invalidates conventional inference procedures (see Stock and Wright 2000).
On the other hand, using many (potentially weak) instruments, while desirable
(see Hansen et al. 2008), may lead to biases and substantial deviations from the
usual Gaussian asymptotic approximation (see Chao and Swanson 2005, Han and
Phillips 2006 and Newey and Windmeijer 2009).
A flexible approach that tackles these issues is to construct optimal instruments
using model averaging in the first-stage of the 2SLS regression that recovers the
structural shocks, following Kuersteiner and Okui (2010). A model averaging ap-
proach provides a more favourable trade-off between bias and efficiency compared
to procedures that rely on a single instrument set, while at the same time allowing
the elimination of redundant instruments in a data-dependent fashion, without
prior knowledge about the strength of the instruments.
Using the method described above and monthly data for the period 1979 to 2012,
the main finding of this chapter is that US monetary policy shocks have a significant
impact on Canada’s macroeconomic variables, but not so for Mexico’s economy.
We find that a contractionary US MP shock affects significantly macro variables in
Canada, causing Canada’s interest rate, output, and bilateral exchange rate to rise
2 These three countries (USA, Canada, and Mexico) are members of trilateral trade bloc in North
America USMCA (formerly NAFTA). In terms of trade both Canada and Mexico are in the list
of top 5 export and import partners of the United States (Based on the World integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS) database)
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and inflation to fall. While the exchange rate and trade channels seem to play a role,
the impact on the financial conditions of US’ neighbouring economies dominates,
particularly in the case of Canada. We carry out various robustness checks and they
generally showed that these results hold. This is in line with a number of papers
that found spillovers of US monetary policy shocks to be heterogeneous (Dedola
et al. 2017) and, more specifically, that Canada and Mexico react to US monetary
policy shocks in a distinct way (Jean Louis et al. 2011). It is not clear, however,
whether this asymmetry is driven by country-specific characteristics (such as trade,
exchange rate regime, and financial integration etc.) as suggested in Georgiadis
(2016) - Dedola et al. (2017), for example, do not to find any clear connection
between country characteristics and the impact of spillovers. Furthermore, we
use Local Projections (LP) of Jorda (2005) as an alternative method to compute
impulse responses of the monetary policy shocks. Qualitatively, the LP method
produce similar results to that we obtain from the baseline SVAR model.
The rest of the chapter is organised follows. In section 1.2 we briefly discuss
related literature, while section 1.3 focuses on the methodology of choice and
describes the data used in this paper. Section 1.4 presents and discusses the
results. Finally, a concluding section 1.5 summarises the paper’s key findings.
1.2 related literature
In the classical international macroeconomics theory, there are three different chan-
nels through which domestic monetary policy shocks can impact foreign economies.
For instance, an expansionary monetary policy should result in a lower domestic
interest rate in comparison to foreign rates and hence a depreciation of the home
currency. Furthermore, this will increase the home trade balance and therefore
the home country’s GDP. Conversely, this will decrease the trade balance and
GDP of the trading partner. This is termed ‘expenditure-switching’ which is a
key feature of the standard Mundell-Fleming model. However, in addition to the
exchange rate channel, there are two other channels that are at play in an open
economy context. These channels are domestic demand and financial spillover and
both have a positive impact on the foreign country’s GDP in case of a monetary
expansion. The increase in home country’s demand will translate into an increase
of domestic imports, leading to higher foreign country exports and therefore to an
increase in the foreign country’s GDP.
Financial spillovers manifest themselves as the expansionary policy reduces do-
mestic long-term yields and thereby increases the price of other asset prices, in
9
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turn leading via portfolio balance effects to capital flows into foreign economies.
Therefore, this will increase local spending and thus GDP in foreign countries.3
Having said the above, the question of whether a domestic expansionary (for in-
stance) monetary policy leads to a positive or negative effect on a foreign country
depends entirely on whether or not the negative impact of the exchange rate chan-
nel is larger than the positive effects of the other two channels. This is an empirical
question that requires estimating the magnitude and sign of these channels and of,
crucially, the net effect.
A well-established literature has investigated spillovers from conventional US
monetary policy (Kim 2001; Faust et al. 2004; Canova 2005, amongst others).
The resultant empirical evidence suggests that the magnitude of the spillovers is
non-negligible across both advanced and emerging economies, with interest rates
and asset prices playing an important role in the transmission of these shocks. The
empirical approach followed by these papers is usually based on two-country VAR
models, with the US as the foreign economy and one additional economy as the
home country. One drawback, however, with this framework is that standard iden-
tification of the US shock (through timing or sign restrictions) requires several US
variables to enter the VAR, and thus the dimension of the estimated VARs quickly
becomes unwieldy. The advantage of our ’abridged’ approach is that the shock
(to a monetary policy indicator) is identified with the aid of external instruments
rather than the full structure of the VAR, which results in increased estimation
precision and efficiency.
More recent research has focused on the transmission of unconventional policy
actions, many of these employing global VARs (GVAR), see for example Bauer and
Neely (2014), Bowman et al. (2015), Chen et al. (2016), Georgiadis (2016), inter
alia. Again, the empirical evidence suggests that the magnitude of the responses
depends on a variety of features of the receiving country’s macro and financial
conditions, such as exchange rate regimes, degree of openness, trade and financial
integration, financial market development, industry structure, amongst others.
Regarding the transmission channels through which spillovers take place, a re-
cent paper by Blanchard (2017) identifies three channels in which monetary policy
transmitted to other countries: increased exports, exchange rate appreciation and
the effect of capital flows on the financial systems. Blanchard (2017) finds that
there is a very limited role for policy coordination and that the most appropriate
tool to reach more plausible results is to focus on capital controls. Furthermore,
Taylor (2013) explores two possible reasons behind the aftermath of the global
financial crisis policies’ spillover and debate around international policy coordina-
3 See Kawai (2015) and Ammer et al. (2016) for a more detailed discussion.
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tion. Whereas the first suggestion is that these spillovers are generated because of
some central bank’s deviation from a rules-based monetary policy, which in turn
caused other banks elsewhere to follow suit, the second possible explanation of this
is that it was an optimal reaction to the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). That pa-
per concludes by calling for a return to ’balanced system of rules-based monetary
policies’ like the sorts that have been used in the 1980s and 90s, but this time to
include the emerging economies. It suggested that this will lead to a system that is
operating near international cooperation equilibrium, with every country pursuing
its optimal policies with no need for formal monetary policy coordination.
1.3 empirical methodology
1.3.1 SVAR-IV
One of the limitations of conventional VARs is that these models are commonly
over-parameterized, which leads to fewer degrees of freedom and therefore less
precise estimation. This issue is particularly acute in 2-country VARmodels, which
require modelling the foreign and home blocks simultaneously. To circumvent this,
we employ an external instrument approach (Stock and Watson 2012; Mertens and
Ravn 2013; Stock and Watson 2018), which involves using external information
that is relevant (correlated with the shocks of interest) and exogenous (uncorrelated
with the other shocks). Thus, it takes advantage of methods that were developed
to directly identify the macroeconomic shocks, which, whilst not fully capturing
the shocks of interest, might result in useful proxies for them.
An increasing number of papers have started to apply various proxies to identify
different types of shocks: Mertens and Ravn (2013), Mertens and Ravn (2014) used
exogenous tax changes found by the narrative approach as a proxy to identify tax
shocks, while Montiel-Olea et al. (2018) have suggested the use of the exogenous
OPEC oil supply shocks to identify the outcome of oil shocks on US economy.
Recently, Gertler and Karadi (2015) used high-frequency data (movements in the
3-month futures rate around FOMC announcements) as an external instrument to
identify US monetary policy shocks to a chosen policy indicator. In this chapter,
we build on Gertler and Karadi (2015)’s results and follow their identification
method, but applying it to an open economy context.
Consider a k-dimension vector yt of observables, which we assume follows a
(simplified) structural VAR of the form
yt = A(L)yt−1 +Bt (1.1)
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where A(.) and B are k × k and t contains the k × 1 vector of structural shocks
with the usual assumptions: E(t) = 0, E(t′t) = Ik and E(t′j) = 0 for t 6=
j. In practice, estimation of (1.1) produces a set of reduced-form residuals, the
corresponding errors being related to the unobserved structural shocks by
ut = Bt (1.2)
with covariance matrix Σu = E(utu′t) = BB′. The central issue is, given con-
sistent estimates, how to recover the elements of B that enable us to reconstruct
t. Common identification approaches usually place timing (short run or long run)
or sign restrictions on the VAR structure, but these are far from satisfactory, as
argued by Gertler and Karadi (2015).
The proxy SVAR takes a different route. Suppose that them-sized vector Zt con-
tains ‘external’ information that is useful to identify the shock of interest (say 1t
for simplicity). For Zt to be a valid instrument, it must be relevant (contemporane-
ously correlated with the structural shock 1t) and exogenous (contemporaneously
uncorrelated with other structural shocks it), i.e.
E(Zt1t) 6= 0 (1.3)
E(Ztit) = 0, i = 2, ..., k (1.4)
Given the reduced-form residuals, if the above conditions are satisfied, Zt may be
used to identify 1t.
Let b denote the column in B that links the impact of the structural policy
shock 1t on the reduced form residuals ut. To obtain estimates of b, we first
estimate the reduced-form counterpart of (1.1) to obtain residuals ut. Let u1t
denote the reduced form residual from the equation concerning the policy indicator
(with uit, i = 2, ..., k denoting the residuals from the remaining equations), with
b1 denoting the response of u1t to a unit change in 1t, while bi (i 6= 1) represents
the response of uit to 1t. Then b1 can be obtained from a two-stage least squares
regression of bi on u1t, using the instrument set Zt.
Indeed, the first stage regression (u1t on Zt) extracts the variation in u1t that is
solely due to the structural policy shock, encapsulated in the relevant fitted value
û1t. The second stage regression of uit on û1t then yields a consistent estimate of
the ratio β = bi/b1. The suitably partitioned estimated reduced form variance-
covariance matrix Σ̂u is then used to separately identify bi and b1, which then
allows us to compute the relevant impulse response function to a monetary policy
shock (see Gertler and Karadi 2015 and Stock and Watson 2018 for a more detailed
description of the methods).
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1.3.2 The Model Averaging Two Step Least Squares (MA2SLS) estimator
As mentioned in the introduction, the applied researcher has now a range of differ-
ent measures of US monetary surprises that can be employed as instruments in Zt
above. These range from the measures obtained from a narrative approach (Romer
and Romer 2004) to measures based on high-frequency changes in interest rates
and interest-rate futures around FOMC announcements (e.g., inter alia, Kuttner
2001; Faust et al. 2004; Gürkaynak et al. 2005; Barakchian and Crowe 2013 and
Gertler and Karadi 2015; Miranda-Agrippino 2016).4
Typically, Zt is chosen based on some measures of first-stage fit, including the
F-statistic and using the threshold of 10 recommended by Stock et al. (2002) (see
Gertler and Karadi 2015, for example). While this is not wrong per se, it is clearly
inefficient. We argue that a much simpler, more flexible and more robust approach
(even when weak instruments are present) is to rely on a model averaging approach,
as developed by Kuersteiner and Okui (2010).
First stage prediction averaging is based on the m× 1 weighting vector W =
(w1, ...,wm), such that
∑m
j=1wj = 1. Interestingly, the weights are allowed to take
on positive and negative values, which explores orthogonal directions in the instru-
ment space that may be useful in the first stage. Defining P (W ) = ∑mi=1wmPm,
where Pm = Zm(Z ′mZm)−1Z ′m is the usual projection matrix, then in our case the
relevant estimator for β is
βˆ = (u′1tP (W )u1t)
−1u′1tP (W )uit (1.5)
The weights are chosen to minimize the approximate mean squared error, i.e. a
function of both bias and variance. Kuersteiner and Okui (2010) consider several
versions for the support of W (Ω), namely unconstrained weights, a compact
set and positive weights only (ΩU , ΩC and ΩP , respectively). The number of
instruments is selected by the first-stage Mallows criterion, as in Hansen (2007).
Kuersteiner and Okui (2010) demonstrate that a model averaging approach strictly
dominates sequential instrument selection from a MSE point of view, while their
simulations show that the estimator performs very well in finite samples, even
when the Zt contains weak or irrelevant instruments.
1.3.3 Data and instruments
We first study a benchmark 2-country SVAR model focusing on the usual macro
economic channels, in which we model the home economy H (Canada or Mex-
4 Several of these are available from Georgios Georgiadis database of monetary policy shocks:
https://sites.google.com/site/georgiosgeorgiadis111/research.
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ico) using the observables yt = [iUS , iH , piH , yH , eH ], where iUS denotes a US
monetary policy indicator as in Gertler and Karadi (2015), iH the corresponding
home-economy variable, piH is the CPI, yH is a measure of output and eH denotes
the bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar. The above specification is then
augmented with further channels, namely asset prices and financial condition indi-
cators, so that the observables are now yt = [iUS , iH , piH , yH , eH , fcH ], with fcH
denoting one from a series of financial variables, namely a national stock price
index, a credit spread measure, a mortgage spread (for Canada only, due to data
limitations for Mexico) or the home economy VIX volatility index. The data used
in this chapter is monthly data for the period from 1979:7 to 2012:6, which repre-
sents part of the ‘Great Moderation’ period and captures the recent financial crisis
as well. All variables enter the model in log form except interest rates, which are
presented in levels. The VAR model has 12 lags, as is commonly used for monthly
data (optimal lag selection procedures will be considered later on, along with other
robustness checks). The data is mostly from OECD data and the FRED database
(Table A.1 in the Appendix contains the detailed sources of data). As for the prox-
ies for monetary surprises, we use the same set of instruments as Gürkaynak et al.
(2005) (GSS henceforth) and Gertler and Karadi (2015) - surprises in the current
month’s fed funds futures (FF1), in 3-month ahead fed funds futures (FF4), as well
as 6 month, 9 month and one year ahead futures on 3-month Eurodollar deposits
(ED2, ED3, ED4) - the Romer and Romer (2004) narrative approach measure,
plus monthly measures of US monetary policy shocks used in Georgiadis and Jan-
cokova (2017), collected from Barakchian and Crowe (2013), Binder et al. (2010),
Mario and Gambetti (2008), Heinlein and Krolzig (2013), Pragidis et al. (2013),
Miranda-Agrippino (2016), and Gazzani and Vicondoa (2016)- see Georgiadis and
Jancokova (2017) for a detailed description of the database. The sample period
for each shock series is quite varied, so in the estimations considered below the
required adjustments are made. We will consider three main cases: 1) the use of
Gertler and Karadi (2015)’s preferred instrument (FF4), 2) the GSS instrument
set, and 3) the full set of instruments.
1.4 empirical results
1.4.1 Baseline model
To estimate the effect of US monetary policy shocks on economic activity of for-
eign countries, we check the impulse response functions that show the reaction
14
1.4 empirical results
of Canada and Mexico macroeconomics variables when faced with US monetary
surprises. Using the baseline model with 12 lags, the federal funds rate as the
policy indicator and the surprise in the three month ahead futures rate (FF4) as
the instrument, we now review the VAR results for Canada and Mexico.
Figure A.1 shows the effect of US monetary shocks on key Canadian macro
variables, by computing IRFs to a 1 unit (100 basis points) deviation in the Fed
Funds rate. They reveal that US MP shocks resulted in an immediate jump in US
interest rate, induced the Canadian interest rate to a significant and immediate
increase for the first year (with peak of around 50 basis points), before going down
and then getting back to its baseline. While they cause the prices in Canada to
decline throughout the period, output increases in the first 10 months before going
down. The bilateral exchange rate increased throughout the period by roughly 0.02
basis points reflecting an increase in the value of US dollar against the Canadian
dollar.
< Figure A.1 >
It can be said that the rise of output in Canada can be explained through
the exchange rate channel, i.e. when a tightening in US monetary policy takes
place, the US dollar appreciates against the Canadian currency. This leads to US
customers demanding more of Canadian goods given that it becomes cheaper and
hence this demand push induces output in Canada to increase. As for the fall of
prices in Canada it less clear. This can be thought of as result of the immediate
increase in the Canadian interest rate caused by the US monetary policy shocks.
In this case, it may be appropriate to say that while the rise of Canadian output
is due an external shock, the fall in prices is due to the rise of Canada’s bank rate
in response to the US monetary tightening. The instrument used in this baseline
model is the three-month ahead monthly fed funds futures (FF4), which given
the data and model explains around 6.5% of the model and the first-stage F-test
indicates that it is not a weak instrument, with an F−statistic of 18.61 (as the
threshold is above 10).
< Figure A.2 >
Turning to the use of the GSS instrument set in Figure A.2 using the MA2SLS
estimator, there are no discernible differences, with an almost exact overlap of
the IRFs. The first-stage F-statistic reveals no problems of weak instrumenta-
tion. Interestingly, when we allow for unconstrained weights, i.e. the weights for
the instruments (FF1, FF4, ED2, ED3 and ED4) may take negative values, the
corresponding values are 0.57, -0.4854, 0.1209, 0.3644, 0.4301, respectively, which
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implies that the preferred instrument of Gertler and Karadi (2015) actually gets
downweighted, with the combination of the remaining instruments producing very
similar results.5
< Figure A.3 >
If, in turn, we use all the available instruments in our list - i.e., combining GSS
with the shocks from Georgiadis and Jancokova (2017) - again the results (in Fig-
ure A.3) are indistinguishable from those with the single instrument and GSS set,
with the F-statistic suggests that there are no problems. It is noteworthy that
with this set, the (updated) shock series from Romer and Romer (2004) gets a
weight of 0.9 if we allow for positive weights, suggesting that it encompasses most
of the information contained in other shock proxies.
In the case of Mexico, on the other hand, the IRFs in Figure A.4 show no signif-
icant impact on Mexican macro variables. US shocks induce a decrease in Mexico
interest rate, small changes in both prices and output, with a small decrease in
the bilateral exchange rate. In this instance, the instrument and model explain
around 15% of the data and the F−test of 46.73 comfortably rejects the notion
of FF4 being a weak instrument. Thus, these results from the use of an external
instrument approach reveal two different worlds. While the impact of US mon-
etary policy shocks is significant on Canada’s macroeconomic variables it is not
significant on the relevant Mexican counterparts.
< Figure A.4 >
These results seem to be in line with a number of papers that, using different
methods, found that spillovers of US monetary policy shocks to be heterogeneous
Dedola et al. (2017) and, more specifically, that Canada and Mexico react to US
monetary policy shocks in an asymmetric way Jean Louis et al. (2011). It is
not clear, however, whether this asymmetry is driven by country-specific charac-
teristics (such as trade, exchange rate regime, and financial integration etc.) as
suggested in Georgiadis (2016). Dedola et al. (2017), on the other hand, reached
a somewhat opposite conclusion, by failing to find any clear connection between
country characteristics and the impact of spillovers.
< Figure A.5 >
5 Results using positive or compact-set weights are very similar and are not reproduced here for
simplicity.
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< Figure A.6 >
Similarly to the US case, the MA2SLS estimation of the VAR produces virtually
identical IRFs (Figures A.5 and A.6), which suggests that there is little gain in
"instrument mining" when a model averaging procedure is available.
1.4.2 The role of asset prices and financial conditions
We now consider the extended VAR model described in 1.3.3, which includes an
additional transmission channel through asset prices and financial/credit condi-
tions. For brevity, and given the discussion above, we will only report results
from MA2SLS estimation. Figures A.7-A.10 illustrate the impact of US monetary
shocks when mortgage spreads, credit spreads, stock prices and a VIX index are
used in turn. While the impact on mortgage spreads is statistically insignificant,
for the other indicators the results are more marked. In particular, asset prices
drop substantially, while volatility and credit spreads increase, with the baseline
results largely unaltered. This suggests there is a non-negligible financial channel
in the international transmission of US policy shocks.
< Figures A.7 to A.10 >
As for Mexico, none of the additional financial variables delivers significant re-
sults. Unlike the case of Canada, where different lag lengths have little effect on
the qualitative nature of the results, for Mexico alternative lag structures, whether
fixed at 12 or determined by different model selection criteria, produce results that
vary in no particular pattern, with occasionally significant effects for the odd vari-
able. However, the overall picture suggests that there is marked heterogeneity in
the results between Canada and Mexico. While some authors place some impor-
tance on the exchange rate regime vis-a-vis the US (e.g. Rey 2016), our results
suggest that an explanation for these differences may be more subtle and complex.
< Figures A.11 to A.13 >
1.4.3 Local Projections
An alternative method to compute impulse responses of the monetary policy shock
is to use the Local Projections à la Jorda (2005). Local projections are based on
direct estimation of one-step regressions, unlike the two-step SVAR. When the
SVAR model is not invertible, then IRFs based on local projections are preferred,
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while under the invertibility of the SVAR, both methods should produce similar
results, with the SVAR being more efficient. We implemented the local projections
method with external instruments following Stock and Watson (2018). Figure A.14
to A.15 show the IRFs from LP-IV method while Figure A.16 and A.17 present a
comparison between SVAR and LP-IV. Qualitatively, both approaches reach the
same conclusions.
< Figures A.14 to A.17 >
1.4.4 Invertibility
Structural shocks’ invertibility is an important condition in the VAR model. As
stated in a recent paper of Levine et al. (2019) invertibility is one of two conditions
(the other is identification) required to be able to compare IRFs from SVAR to
those resulting from a DSGE model. As we have addressed identification in the
methodology part, figures A.18 and A.19 provide the results of the test for VAR
invertibility as suggested by Stock and Watson (2018). The test results show that
our VAR model passes the invertibility test.
< Figures A.18 to A.19 >
1.5 conclusion
This chapter examines the effect of domestic monetary policy on foreign countries;
we used the effect of US monetary policy shocks on Canada and Mexico as a case
study. The choice of these countries was stimulated not only by the geographical
location, which makes it more likely that a shock from the largest economy (i.e.
the US) can be more observable in these smaller neighbouring countries, but also
due to the dissimilarity of the economic structure between Mexico and Canada.
We use monthly data from 1979:7 to 2012:6 with seven variables that describe
the economy in both US and the foreign country. Following Stock and Watson
(2012), Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Stock and Watson (2018), we use Structural
VARs and employ an external instrument as an identification method. We find
that contractionary US MP shocks affect significantly macro variables in Canada,
causing Canada’s interest rate, output, and bilateral exchange rate to rise and
prices to fall. In contrast, these US shocks do not have a significant impact on
Mexico aggregate variables. Further investigation and robustness checks reveal
similar patterns and confirm the baseline results. These insignificant results in the
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case of Mexico may be due to one of the following. It is either that Mexico’s time
series data are not informative enough (i.e. Mexico being an emerging economy
is more volatile and hence the quality of the data is worse). Or that there are
different channels with different sizes and signs at play and therefore we have in
Mexico a combination where these channels are offsetting each other.
It can be seen that, although the impact of these shocks is significant in some
cases, their size and magnitude are not substantial. This result is in line with pre-
vious research results which indicate that the magnitude of the spillovers generated
from the economic interdependency (between the US and euro area for instance) is
not that big (for example Galí and Gertler 2010, Chen et al. 2014). Furthermore,
we used Local Projections (LP) of Jorda (2005) as an alternative method to com-
pute impulse responses of the monetary policy shocks. Broadly speaking, the LP
method produce similar results to that we obtain from the baseline SVAR model.
Further research would be necessary to investigate and explain these results
that we present in the baseline model. In the next chapter, we construct a theoret-
ical model (DSGE model) with relevant transmission channels and various pricing
systems to further understand the features that we observe in the data.
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2 THE IMPACT OF US MONETARY
POL ICY ON CANADA AND MEX ICO :
THE CASE OF PCP VS DCP
2.1 introduction
With more than ten years since the great financial crisis of 2007/08, there are still
many questions left unanswered and lessons to be learned. An important set of
questions relates to the impact of advanced economies’ monetary policy on emerg-
ing economies. In particular, what are the size and sign of the spillovers and what
are the channels via which domestic monetary policy transmits internationally?
The growing literature on this is far from having yet established any consensus, as
results tend to point in all directions. This disagreement may possibly be due to
differences in data sources, methodology and modelling choices.1 Moreover, there
is still little clarity on the transmission of monetary policy into emerging markets
(EM henceforth) given the scarcity of high frequency data and the non-existence
of any narrative methods (à la Romer and Romer (2004)) to identify the shocks in
EM. Recent study by Georgiadis and Jancokova (2017) listed 60 empirical studies
of monetary policy shocks in EM and SOE with only 5 papers using high frequency
identification (HFI) and none-using a narrative approach.
In the meantime, in many developing countries the conduct of monetary policy
by the advanced economies’ central banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis
is seen as worrying action that could lead to a currency war.2 Indeed, such reac-
tion may be justified under a classic Mundell-Fleming understanding, according to
which a cut in interest rates (in the US for instance) should result in a depreciation
of the US currency versus its trading partner’s currency and therefore decrease the
demand for the trading partner’s products and make it less competitive. However,
if one is to allow for price rigidity, as one does in a Mundel-Fleming framework, it
1 See for instance: Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Christiano et al. (1999), Uhlig (2005), Taylor
(2013) among others
2 Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff stated that advanced economies are creating a ’mon-
etary tsunami’ by using quantitative easing as a policy instrument. Similarly, leaders from other
emerging markets ( i.e. Turkey, India and Indonesia etc..) showed their concerns. Furthermore,
Brazil finance minister then also warned that such policies may lead to currency wars.
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is crucial to know in which currency prices are rigid. In this regard, a distinction
among three different paradigms has emerged: prices may be set in the producer’s
currency (Producer Currency Pricing, PCP henceforth), in the buyer’s currency
(Local Currency Pricing, LCP henceforth), or in a dominant currency that is nei-
ther the buyer’s nor seller’s (Dominant Currency Pricing, DCP henceforth), often
the dollar.
Each of these pricing models will have different implications on both domestic
and international levels. In the basic Mundell-Fleming model, which assumes that
prices are rigid in the PCP, a cut to the Fed’s rates will, through different channels,
lead to a depreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis the trading partner’s currency, thus
resulting in more demand for US domestic products and in an appreciation of the
trading balance of the US (in a phenomenon known as expenditure switching).
In other words, under PCP assumption, local prices will fluctuate in response to
changes in the nominal exchange rates and hence law of one price hold. Therefore,
the exchange rate pass-through into prices is 100% (i.e. perfect pass-through).3
Despite decades of research in this area, this analysis of the impact of monetary
policy is still the main way to explain the international propagation of domestic
shocks into the international arena. However, another two models have emerged
providing alternative narratives.
Thus, under a LCP regime, prices are sticky in the destination country’s currency.
In this case, shocks to the nominal exchange rate will not affect the prices of
imported goods and hence in the short run there will be a deviation from the law
of one price. Therefore, exchange rate pass-through into imported prices is 0%.4
Recent studies, however, suggest that both of these pricing schemes seem to be
at odds with the trends seen in international trade transactions. Firms set prices
in very few currencies (with the dollar being the most frequently used currency)
and do not change prices often (Goldberg and Tille 2010, Gopinath 2015). These
observations have led to the recent emergence of a literature that considers a Dom-
inant Currency Pricing (DCP henceforth) paradigm. Under this regime, prices
are anchored in a third currency that is not necessarily that of any of the parties
involved in the transaction. In this case, changes in nominal exchange rate will
only weakly impact the terms of trade while the main factor in terms of prices and
quantity of imported goods will be country’s currency value vis-à-vis the dollar.
Motivated by the recent studies on pricing paradigms and in search of more
conclusive evidence on the magnitude and direction of international spillovers,
we attempt to contribute to the literature by shedding light on the impact of
3 with full PCP
4 with full LCP
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advanced/large economies monetary policy on international trade transactions of
small open economies.
More specifically, in this paper, we are working on investigating the impact of
the US monetary policy on its two neighbours Canada and Mexico under two differ-
ent pricing regimes: Producer Currency Pricing (PCP); and Dominant Currency
Pricing (DCP) models. The choice of these countries is stimulated by their geo-
graphical proximity to the US, which makes shocks in the largest economy (i.e. the
US) have plausibly sizeable effects on these relatively smaller neighbouring coun-
tries, but also by the dissimilarity in economic structures between Mexico and
Canada.5 It is also motivated by the recent signing of the new trade agreement
in North America called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
that is meant to replace The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
We seek to use a structural DSGE model and historical data in order to estimate
the impact of US domestic monetary policy on its USMCA partners. We do this
using a state-of-art dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (New Keynesian
(NK) DSGE model) that captures the impact of US monetary policy on these two
countries. We model the US as a closed NK economy that is not affected by shocks
from the other, small, countries. Mexico and Canada are in turn modelled as small
open economies (SOE) that are affected by shocks from the ROW. The model is
estimated for both pricing regimes and the results of the two countries under these
pricing models are compared. More details on the choice of the methodology and
the estimation method are mentioned provided in the third and fourth sections.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we add to the expanding
literature on dominant currency pricing by showing the effects of DCP in the case
of Canada and Mexico, while comparing these two distinct pricing systems (PCP
and DCP) from an empirical perspective, to see which of them fit the data better.
Second, we further the understanding of the transmission of US monetary policy
into small open economies (and especially emerging markets in the case of Mexico)
by comparing the spillovers from the US monetary policy across these countries
and discuss the similarities and differences in terms of sign and size of the impact.
Third, as it will be explained in the methodology section, estimating the model
using an equal number of shocks and observables permits invertibility (i.e. which
implies fundamentalness) and therefore our results could be readily compared to
those obtained in chapter one using Local Projections (LP). Also, in light of the
invertibility test’s results that we have presented in chapter 16, then the resulting
5 In terms of labour market structure, financial market development and integration and overall
government policies, amongst others.
6 Showing that our Vector Autoregression (VAR) model is indeed invertible.
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IRFs can be compared as well with those from the DSGE model as indicated in a
recent working paper of Levine et al. (2019).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 will briefly discuss re-
lated literature, while section 2.3 and 2.4 focuses on the methodology of choice,
describes the main features of model used and highlights the estimation method.
Section 2.5 to 2.7 presents and discusses the results. Finally, a concluding section
2.8 summarises the paper’s key findings.
2.2 literature review
This paper is related to three strands of literature: that on international monetary
policy spillovers, on pricing in open economy models, and on emerging economies.
There have been numerous studies in all three areas, the most relevant of which
we try to bring together.
The impact of domestic monetary policy on other countries has been a very ac-
tive area of research in the last few decades. The main questions that it discusses
revolve around the following. What impact does a contractionary monetary pol-
icy in the US have on business cycles of other countries? Does it boost or burst
financial conditions abroad? Does it aid the flow of capital in or out of the US?
Do spillovers vary across developed and developing countries, or across countries
whose currencies are pegged relative to the dollar and those that are not? Available
literature suggests that spillover effects can be sizeable, though considerable het-
erogeneity exists across countries in terms of the response of their macroeconomic
variables, asset prices, and financial flows with links between effects and country
characteristics often observed to be vague (see Dedola et al. 2017).
To address these questions many of the previous studies focused on one or two
of these areas. Many studies have focused on investigating the main channels
through which shocks are transmitted. Using a VAR model, Kim (2001) found
that a decrease in the world interest rate to play a major role in the propagation
of the shocks while trade balance to play a much less important role. In the
meantime, investigating the credit channel, Romer and Romer. (1993) and Ramey
(1993) found this channel to play an insignificant role, while Bernanke and Gertler
(1995) find that there is a direct relationship between monetary policy shocks and
the credit channel.
Another area of research under this topic is measuring the spillover impact
on other countries. This is done through the employment of empirical methods
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such as VAR, as well as DSGE models. The idea in this type of research is to
quantify the size and sign of the impact of the international spillovers coming
from domestic policies. An example is Canova (2005), who investigates the impact
of US monetary policy on Latin America countries. The paper uses monthly data
with VAR and sign restrictions and found that the US monetary policy shocks have
a significant impact on the eight Latin American countries that have been studied.
A more general paper 7 is that of Ammer et al. (2016) in which it attempts to
compute the impact of US monetary policy internationally. Although using back-
of-the-envelope calculations, it shows that it is important to consider the various
channels that come into play. It shows that without considering all these different
channels it is hard to be certain on the sign or size of this impact. In their
simple example, they show that it is actually possible that an expansionary US
monetary policy can lead to a positive international impact. Finally, Georgiadis
(2016) studies the main factors that influence the impact of the US monetary policy
internationally. It showed that the impact of monetary policy globally is not the
same across countries and that it is influenced by factors such as the exchange rate
regime, the degree of openness, trade and financial integration, financial market
development, and industry structure. The paper suggested that countries could
eventually protect themselves or minimize the impact of US shocks through close
trading ties with the US, by improving their domestic financial and labour markets
and by adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime. The paper used quarterly
data for 61 countries with a global VAR method.
Another dimension to this literature is the differences in terms of effectiveness
domestically as well as in terms of global effects between conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary policy. While the main belief is that unconventional monetary
policy has a larger propagation, a recent paper by Curcuru et al. (2018) investi-
gated this assumption using a new method to disentangle the long term return
on bond ‘into expected short rate and term premium components’ to be able to
compare the impact of conventional and unconventional monetary policies on these
different components. The results concluded that in contrast to the common belief,
conventional monetary policy has a higher impact.
The second area is related to pricing in open economy models. As explained be-
fore, this branch of literature focuses on the importance of which currency prices
are sticky in. This literature can be traced back to the seminal model of Mundell-
Fleming (Mundell 1963, Fleming 1962), in which they initiated the modelling of
the interaction between macroeconomic variables within an open economy. As
7 General in sense that it focuses on the impact of shocks to the US monetary policy globally
without studying a specific country or continent
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explained earlier in this model and the literature that follows the maintained as-
sumption is that prices are preset in the producer currency. In a few decades, other
studies came to suggest that the first framework fails to explain the trends that are
observed in the data. This gave rise to a new paradigm which has been called local
pricing producers. This paradigm assumes that prices are rigid in the destination
currency, see Betts and Devereux (2000) and Devereux and Engel. (2003). Since
then, there has been a growing body of literature that studies the observation of
the frequent use of the dollar as a currency that firms set their prices in. These
so-called ‘dollar pricing’ studies, try to explain how firms make their choice of
which currency to use in setting their prices in international trade.
A more recent and important paper in this literature is Casas et al. (2017)
which draws on Gita Gopinath’ and co-authors’ work over the past ten years8
on international trade transactions and firms’ choice of currency. This collective
work suggests that what is observed in the international transaction data is that
most firms set their prices in a few currencies and that they do not change them
frequently. Also, it shows that among these few currencies the dollar remains the
most often used currency. As argued in the paper, firms invoice in dollars for possi-
bly two reasons: 1. Strategic complementarities in prices 2. Imported intermediate
inputs. From these empirical facts, Casas et al. (2017) built a theoretical model
to test the impact of this new paradigm that they named the dominant currency
paradigm on the transmission of shocks. They compared predictions of the three
pricings paradigms (i.e. PCP, LCP and DCP) and showed that under DCP terms
of trade is less sensitive to the changes in the bilateral nominal exchange rate and
more affected by the changes in relation to the dollar. They also showed that a
constant increase in value of the dollar may weaken the global trade as prices of
goods will increase globally.
2.3 dsge model description
In this section, we describe the details of our DSGE model that we are going to
estimate using Bayesian methods. The model economy is a two-block dynamic
general equilibrium model. We consider two cases:
1. A small open economy (SOE) interacting with the rest of the world (ROW)
but with no policy strategic interdependence. Then the ROW is modelled
as the closed New Keynesian model which can be estimated separately.
8 This include Gopinath and Rigobon. (2008); Gopinath and Neiman (2014), Gopinath (2015);
and Boz et al. (2017)
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2. Two large blocs (e.g., the Euro-zone and the US) with strategic policy in-
terdependence. Then an equilibrium of welfare-optimizing rules depend on
whether the two blocs coordinate their policy or not.
We first consider the latter case and then show that the ROW-SOE (which is
the focus of this chapter) is a special case of the general model.
2.3.1 Notation and Dixit-Stiglitz Aggregates
In each bloc, domestically produced and imported goods are consumed with prices
denominated in the country’s currency with notation summarized in Table 2.1:
Domestic Production Imported Good Aggregate
Home Country Quantity CH,t CF ,t Ct
Home Country Price PH,t PF ,t Pt
Foreign Country Quantity C∗F ,t C∗H,t C∗t
Foreign Country Price P ∗F ,t P ∗H,t P ∗t
Table 2.1: Consumption Notations
For the Home country, aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz consumption and price indices
are given by
Ct = C
DS(wC ,µC ,CH,t,CF ,t) ≡
[
w
1
µC
C C
µC−1
µC
H,t + (1−wC)
1
µC C
µC−1
µC
F ,t
] µC
µC−1
(2.1)
Pt = P
DS(wC ,µC ,CH,t,CF ,t) ≡
[
wC P 1−µCH,t + (1−wC)P 1−µCF ,t
] 1
1−µC (2.2)
PtCt = PH,tCH,t + PF ,tCF ,t (2.3)
The weight wC in the consumption baskets in the home bloc is a measure of ‘home
bias’. If wC = 1, we have autarky.
Maximising total consumption (2.1) subject to a given aggregate expenditure
PtCt = PH,tCH,t + PF ,tCF ,t yields
CH,t = wC
(
PH,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct (2.4)
CF ,t = (1−wC)
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct (2.5)
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For the Foreign country, aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz consumption and price indices
are given by
C∗t = C
DS(w∗C ,µ∗C ,C∗F ,t,C∗H,t) (2.6)
P ∗t = P
DS(w∗C ,µ∗C ,C∗F ,t,C∗H,t) (2.7)
P ∗t C
∗
t = P
∗
F ,tC
∗
F ,t + P
∗
H,tC
∗
H,t (2.8)
Then, foreign consumption functions corresponding to (2.4) and (2.5) are:
C∗F ,t = w∗C
(
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t (2.9)
C∗H,t = (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t (2.10)
Investment is analogous: in each bloc, domestically produced and imported
goods are used for investment with prices denominated in the country’s currency
with notation summarized in Table 2.2:
Domestic Production Imported Good Aggregate
Home Country Quantity IH,t IF ,t It
Home Country Price PH,t PF ,t P It
Foreign Country Quantity I∗F ,t I∗H,t I∗t
Foreign Country Price P ∗F ,t P ∗H,t P I
∗
t
Table 2.2: Investment Notations
For the Home country, aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz investment and price indices are
given by
It = I
DS(wI ,µI , IH,t, IF ,t) ≡
[
w
1
µI
I I
µI−1
µI
I,t + (1−wI)
1
µI I
µI−1
µI
F ,t
] µI
µI−1
(2.11)
P It = P
DS(wI ,µI , IH,t, IF ,t) ≡
[
wI P 1−µIH,t + (1−wI)P 1−µIF ,t
] 1
1−µI (2.12)
PtIt = PH,tIH,t + PF ,tIF ,t (2.13)
The weight wI in the consumption baskets in the home bloc is a measure of ‘home
bias’ for investment. If wI = 1, we have autarky.
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Maximising total investment (2.11) subject to a given aggregate expenditure
P It It = PH,tIH,t + PF ,tIF ,t yields
IH,t = wI
(
PH,t
P It
)−µI
It (2.14)
IF ,t = (1−wI)
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI
It (2.15)
For the Foreign country, aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz investment and price indices
are given by
I∗t = I
DS(w∗I ,µ∗I , I∗F ,t, I∗H,t) (2.16)
P I
∗
t = P
DS(w∗I ,µ∗I , I∗F ,t, I∗H,t) (2.17)
P I
∗
t I
∗
t = P
∗
F ,tI
∗
F ,t + P
∗
H,tI
∗
H,t (2.18)
Then, foreign invesment functions corresponding to (2.14) and (2.15) are:
I∗F ,t = w∗I
(
P ∗F ,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t (2.19)
I∗H,t = (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t (2.20)
If wC = wI = w∗C = w∗I = 1 we have autarky.
2.3.2 The Law of One Price, Terms of Trade and Inflation
Let St be the nominal exchange rate defined as the cost of one unit of Foreign
currency in the Home bloc. We assume the law of one price holds and hence
StP
∗
H,t = PH,t (2.21)
StP
∗
F ,t = PF ,t (2.22)
The terms of trade for the home country are defined as Tt ≡ PF ,tPH,t , the price of the
imported good relative to the domestic one, and T ∗t ≡
P ∗H,t
P ∗F ,t
for the Foreign bloc.
Hence from the law of one price
Tt ≡ PF ,t
PH,t
=
StP
∗
F ,t
StP ∗H,t
=
P ∗F ,t
P ∗H,t
=
1
T ∗t
(2.23)
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Now define CPI, domestic and imported inflation rates over the interval [t− 1, t]
for the Home bloc by
Πt−1,t ≡ Pt
Pt−1
(2.24)
ΠH,t−1,t ≡ PH,t
PH,t−1
(2.25)
ΠF ,t−1,t ≡ PF ,t
PF ,t−1
(2.26)
The foreign counterparts of CPI, domestic and imported inflation rates over the
interval [t− 1, t] are defined by
Π∗t−1,t ≡
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
(2.27)
Π∗F ,t−1,t ≡
P ∗F ,t
P ∗F ,t−1
(2.28)
Π∗H,t−1,t ≡
P ∗H,t
P ∗H,t−1
(2.29)
Then from (2.2) and (2.7) we have
Πt−1,t =
wC
(
ΠH,t−1,t
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)1−µC
+ (1−wC)
(
ΠF ,t−1,t
PF ,t−1
Pt−1
)1−µC
1
1−µC
(2.30)
Π∗t−1,t =
w∗C
(
Π∗F ,t−1,t
P ∗F ,t−1
P ∗t−1
)1−µ∗C
+ (1−w∗C)
(
Π∗H,t−1,t
P ∗H,t−1
P ∗t−1
)1−µ∗C
1
1−µ∗
C
(2.31)
where for the Home bloc:
Tt
Tt−1 =
ΠF ,t−1,t
ΠH,t−1,t
(2.32)
Pt
PH,t
=
(
wC + (1−wC)T 1−µCt
) 1
1−µC (2.33)
Pt
PF ,t
=
(
wCT µC−1t + (1−wC)
) 1
1−µC (2.34)
P It
PH,t
=
(
wI + (1−wI)T 1−µIt
) 1
1−µI (2.35)
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P It
PF ,t
=
(
wIT µI−1t + (1−wI)
) 1
1−µI (2.36)
and for the Foreign bloc:
T ∗t
T ∗t−1
=
Π∗H,t−1,t
Π∗F ,t−1,t
(2.37)
P ∗t
P ∗F ,t
=
(
w∗C + (1−w∗C)(T ∗t )1−µ
∗
C
) 1
1−µ∗
C (2.38)
P ∗t
P ∗H,t
=
(
w∗C(T ∗t )µ
∗
C−1 + (1−w∗C)
) 1
1−µ∗
C (2.39)
P I
∗
t
P ∗F ,t
=
(
w∗I + (1−w∗I)(T ∗t )1−µ
∗
I
) 1
1−µ∗
I (2.40)
P I
∗
t
P ∗H,t
=
(
w∗I(T ∗t )µ
∗
I−1 + (1−w∗I)
) 1
1−µ∗
I (2.41)
The real exchange rate is defined as RERt = StP
∗
t
Pt
. Then from (2.34) and (2.38)
and the law of one price we have
RERt =
StP
∗
t
Pt
=
StP
∗
t /P ∗F ,t
Pt/P ∗F ,t
=
P ∗t /P ∗F ,t
Pt/StPF ,t∗ =
P ∗t /P ∗F ,t
Pt/PF ,t
(2.42)
=
(
w∗C + (1−w∗C)(T ∗t )1−µ
∗
C
) 1
1−µ∗
C(
wCT µC−1t + (1−wC)
) 1
1−µC
(2.43)
Thus, in the symmetric bloc case where wC = w∗C and µC = µ∗C , since Tt = 1/T ∗t
the law of one price (RERt = 1) holds for the aggregate price indices. Otherwise
it does not.
This completes the equilibrium for Home variables {Tt, PtPH,t ,
Pt
PF ,t
,Πt−1,t,
ΠF ,t−1,t,CH,t,CF ,t, IH,t, IF ,t, } given Ct, It and domestic in-
flation ΠH,t−1,t, and for the corresponding Foreign variables
{T ∗t , P
∗
t
P ∗F ,t
, P
∗
t
P ∗H,t
,Π∗t−1,t,Π∗H,t−1,t,C∗F ,t,C∗H,t, I∗F ,t, I∗H,t, } given C∗t , I∗t and for-
eign domestic inflation Π∗F ,t−1,t.
2.3.3 Households
Households in the H bloc hold both domestic and foreign bonds, but those in the
F bloc only hold domestic bonds. Households are divided in those who participate
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in the financial sector and can lend or borrow to each other. These are Ricardian
consumers. The remaining rule-of-thumb consumers are credit-constrained and
must consume out of wage income net of tax.
Ricardian Consumers
There are (1− λ) non-credit constrained Ricardian (R) consumers. Households
single-period utility is:
URt = U(C
R
t ,LRt ) =
(
CRt − χCRt−1
)(1−%)(1−σ) (
1−HRt
)%(1−σ) − 1
1− σ (2.44)
The household solves
max
CRt ,LRt
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βsU(CRt+s,HRt+s)
]
(2.45)
subject to a nominal budget constraint given by
PBt BH,t + P
B
t
∗
StB
∗
F ,t = BH,t−1 + StB
∗
F ,t−1 + PtWt (1− τwt )HRt − PtCRt + Γt
(2.46)
with nominal profits given by Γt and a proportional labour tax given by τwt . BH,t
and B∗F ,t are domestic and foreign bonds respectively, bought at nominal prices PBt
and PBt
∗ and denominated in the respective currencies. Pt is the CPI index that
includes an imported component (see (2.2) above) and St is the nominal exchange
rate.
Maximizing (2.45) subject to the budget constraint we have
PBt = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
]
(2.47)
PBt
∗
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
St+1
St
]
(2.48)
URH,t
URC,t
= − %1− %
CRt − χCRt−1
1−HRt
= −Wt (1− τwt ) (2.49)
where Λt,t+1 ≡ βU
R
C,t+1
URC,t
.
Nominal return on home bonds is by definition Rt = 1PBt , where Rt is set by
the central bank. We assume foreign bonds are subject to a risk premium that
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depends on the exposure to foreign debt, R∗t = 1
PBt
∗
φ
(
StB
∗
F ,t
PH,tYt
) . Additionally, we
assume φ(0) = 1 and φ′ < 0. A functional form with these properties is
φ(x) = exp(−φBx) ; φB > 0 (2.50)
Write equation (2.47) as
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
]
Rt (2.51)
and equation (2.48) as
1 = R∗tφ
(
StB
∗
F ,t
PH,tYt
)
Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
ΠSt,t+1
]
(2.52)
where ΠSt,t+1 ≡ St+1St is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate over the
interval [t, t+ 1] (i.e., the depreciation rate). Equations (2.51) and (2.52) together
give a UIP condition modified to allow for risk.
Credit-constrained Households
The remaining λ consumers are credit constrained (C) and have no income from
monopolistic retail firms. They must consume out of wage income and their con-
sumption is given by
CCt = Wt (1− τwt )HCt (2.53)
Liquidity constrained consumers now choose CCt and LCt = 1−HCt , to maximize
an analogous welfare function to (2.45) subject to (2.53). The first order conditions
are now the same for both types
UCH,t
UCC,t
= − %1− %
CCt − χCCt−1
1−HCt
=
URH,t
URC,t
= −Wt (1− τwt ) (2.54)
2.3.4 Aggregate Consumption and Labour
Total consumption and hours are then
Ct = λC
C
t + (1− λ)CRt (2.55)
Ht = λH
C
t + (1− λ)HRt (2.56)
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2.3.5 Export Demand, Trade Balances and Output Equilibrium
Total exports by the Home and Foreign Country are respectively given by
EXt ≡ C∗H,t + I∗H,t
= (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t + (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t (2.57)
EX∗t ≡ CF ,t + IF ,t
= (1−wC)
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct + (1−wI)
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI
It (2.58)
Note that for the two-bloc model, we no longer allow w∗C and wI∗ to tend to unity.
Nominal trade balance in the Home and Foreign blocs are respectively
Pt TBt = St P
∗O
n Y
O + PH,tYt − PtCt − P It It − PH,tGt
= St P
∗O
n Y
O + PH,tYt − PH,tCH,t − PF ,tCF ,t − PH,tIH,t
− PF ,tIF ,t − PH,tGt (2.59)
P ∗t TB
∗
t = P
∗
F ,tY
∗
t − P ∗t C∗t − P I
∗
t I
∗
t − P ∗F ,tG∗t
= P ∗F ,tY
∗
t − P ∗F ,tC∗F ,t − P ∗H,tC∗H,t − P ∗F ,tI∗F ,t
− P ∗H,tI∗H,t − P ∗F ,tG∗t (2.60)
Output equilibrium in the two blocs requires
Yt = CH,t +C
∗
H,t + IH,t + I
∗
H,t +Gt (2.61)
Y ∗t = C
∗
F ,t +CF ,t + I
∗
F ,t + IF ,t +G
∗
t (2.62)
Then combining (2.59)–(2.62) we have
Pt TBt = St P
∗O
n Y
O + PH,t(C
∗
H,t + I
∗
H,t)− PF ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t)
= St P
∗O
n Y
O + PH,tEXt − PF ,tIMt (2.63)
P ∗t TB
∗
t = P
∗
F ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t)− P ∗H,t(C∗H,t + I∗H,t)
= P ∗F ,tEX
∗
t − P ∗H,tIM∗t (2.64)
denominated in units of H and F currency respectively, where IMt and IM∗t are
imports for the two blocs. In units of the H currency (2.64) becomes
St P
∗
t TB
∗
t = StP
∗
F ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t)− StP ∗H,t(C∗H,t + I∗H,t) = PF ,tEX∗t − PH,tEXt
(2.65)
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2.3.6 Firms
There are wholesale and retail sectors. The former act in perfect competition pro-
ducing a homogeneous intermediate good, the latter in monopolistic competition
producing differentiated final goods. In addition we have capital producers.
Wholesale sector
Production technology:
YWt =F (At,Ht,Kt−1) = (AtHt)αK1−αt−1 (2.66)
Wholesale firms sell at nominal price PWt to retailers, so profit maximisation im-
plies
FH,t =α
YWt
Ht
PWt
PH,t
PH,t
Pt
= Wt (2.67)
FK,t =(1− α) Y
W
t
Kt−1
PWt
PH,t
PH,t
Pt
= rKt (2.68)
where Pt is price index of final consumption goods.
Capital Producers
Capital producers purchase investment goods from home and foreign retail firms
at real price P
I
t
Pt
selling at real price Qt to maximize expected discounted profits
Et
∞∑
k=0
Λt,t+k
[
Qt+k(1−S (It+k/It+k−1))It+k − P
I
t
Pt
It+k
]
where total capital accumulates according to
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1−S(Xt))It (2.69)
It =
[
w
1
µI
I I
µI−1
µI
H,t + (1−wI)
1
µI I
µI−1
µI
F ,t
] µI
µI−1
(2.70)
This results in the first-order condition
Qt(1−S(Xt)−XtS ′(Xt)) +Et
[
Λt,t+1Qt+1S ′(Xt+1)I
2
t+1
I2t
]
=
P It
Pt
(2.71)
34
2.3 dsge model description
where we define
S(Xt) ≡ φX(Xt −X)2 (2.72)
Note that in the absence of investment adjustment costs, the relative price of
capital, Qt will equal P
I
t
Pt
. Finally, we define RKt as gross real return on capital
taking into account corporate taxation given by
RKt =
rKt
(
1− τkt
)
+ (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
(2.73)
where τkt is a tax on corporate profits assumed exogenous in the model.
Retail Sector
Each home retailer m ∈ (0, 1) purchases output from the intermediate good sector
at price PWH,t and converts into a differentiated good sold at price PH,t(m) to
households, capital good producers and governments who use the technology
CH,t =
(∫ 1
0
CH,t(m)
(ζ−1)/ζdm
)ζ/(ζ−1)
(2.74)
to combine into baskets, where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. Similarly for IH,t
and Gt.
The price-setting proceeds exactly as for the closed economy NK model: for the
SOE we simply replace Pt, Πt−1,t and Πt,t+1 with PH,t, ΠH,t−1,t and ΠH,t,t+1
respectively.
2.3.7 Commodity Sector
We introduce a commodity sector (e.g. oil) treating output as an exogenous con-
stant endowment Y O. Revenues is then driven only by the price of the commodity
P ∗Ot denominated in foreign currency, which is an exogenous process as for the
other shock processes in the model. The commodity is entirely exported and the
only channel through which commodity production and price effects the model is
the trade balance and government budget constraint given below. A tax rate τot
applies to this sector.
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2.3.8 Financial Intermediation
Efficient financial intermediation within the Home country implies the zero arbi-
trage condition:
Et
[
Λt,t+1RKt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
]
Rt = 1 (2.75)
which we take as the equilibrium equation for Qt.
2.3.9 Central Bank, Foreign Assets and Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate Rt is a policy variable, typically given in the literature
by a standard Taylor-type rule9 that includes an exchange rate depreciation term:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
θpi log
(
Πt−1,t
Π
)
+ θs log
(
ΠS,t−1,t
ΠS
)
+ θy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ θdy log
(
Yt
Yt−1
) ]
+ M ,t (2.76)
Foreign bond holdings evolves according to home country nominal terms
PBt
∗
StB
∗
F ,t = StB
∗
F ,t−1 + PtTBt (2.77)
Now define BF ,t ≡ StB
∗
F ,t
Pt
to be the stock of foreign bonds in home country
consumption units. Then
PBt
∗
PtBF ,t =
St
St−1
Pt−1BF ,t−1 + PtTBt ⇒
PBt
∗
BF ,t =
ΠSt−1,t
Πt−1,t
BF ,t−1 + TBt (2.78)
Finally a government nominal balanced budget constraint gives
PH,tGt = PtWtHtτ
w
t + (1− α)YWt PH,tMCtτkt (2.79)
recalling that MCt ≡ P
W
t
PH,t
.
τwt =
PH,t
Pt
Gt − (1− α)YWt MCtτkt −RERt P ∗Ot Y O τO
WtHt
(2.80)
9 In a closed-economy NK model with credit-constrained consumers, Bilbiie (2008) shows that an
inversion of the Taylor principle occurs with a sufficient high proportion of such households.
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With non-distortionary lump-sum taxes we put τkt = τwt = 0 and replace (2.80)
with
PH,tGt = Tt (2.81)
which defines the lump-sum taxes necessary to finance government spending with
a balanced government budget constraint.
Monetary Policy in ROW Block
The ROW nominal interest rate is given by the following Taylor-type rule
log
(
R∗t
R∗
)
= ρr log
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)
+ (1− ρ∗r)
[
θpi∗ log
(
Π∗t−1,t
Π∗
)
+ θy∗ log
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)
+ θdy∗ log
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗t−1
) ]
+ M∗,t (2.82)
2.3.10 Shock processes
The structural shock processes in log-linearised form are assumed to follow AR(1)
processes which for the Home country are:
logAt − logA = ρA(logAt−1 − logA) + A,t
logGt − logG = ρG(logGt−1 − logG) + G,t
logMSt − logMS = ρMS(logMSt−1 − logMS) + MS,t
log ISt − log IS = ρIS(log ISt−1 − log IS) + IS,t
log tott − log tot = ρtot(log tott−1 − log tot) + tot,t
logP ∗Ot − logP ∗O = ρP ∗O(logP ∗Ot−1 − logP ∗O) + P ∗O,t
where MS = A = IS = tot = P ∗O = 1 in the steady state (so logMS = logA =
log IS = log tot = logP ∗O = 0), while the monetary policy shock M ,t is assumed
to be i.i.d with zero mean. For the terms of trade shock we replace the equilibrium
terms of trade variable T with tott, where tott is a temporary exogenous deviation
from the equilibrium given by the AR1 process. Noting that for this shock the
steady state tot = 1.
Similarly the ROW exogenous variables are assumed to also be AR1 processes.
logA∗t − logA∗ = ρ∗A(logA∗t−1 − logA∗) + ∗A,t
logG∗t − log(G¯∗) = ρ∗G(logG∗t−1 − log(G¯∗)) + ∗G,t
logMS∗t − logMS∗ = ρ∗MS(logMS∗t−1 − logMS∗) + ∗MS,t
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log IS∗t − log IS∗ = ρ∗IS(log IS∗t−1 − log IS∗) + ∗IS,t
where MS∗ = A∗ = IS∗ = 1 in the steady state (so logMS∗ = log IS∗ = 0),
while the monetary policy shock M∗,t is assumed to be i.i.d with zero mean.
This completes the specification of the two-bloc open-economy model.
2.3.11 Bloc Size Effects and the SOE
In our representative agent model, all variables such as Yt and Y ∗t are per capita
quantities and can differ for example because labour productivity in the steady
state A 6= A∗. The implication up to now is that population sizes are the same in
both blocs. We now let the F bloc have a population n times that of the H bloc.
In the limit as n→∞ we get to the SOE-ROW model .
The output equilibria in two blocs now become
Yt = CH,t + nC
∗
H,t + IH,t + n I
∗
H,t +Gt
= CH,t + IH,t +Gt +EXt (2.83)
nY ∗t = nC
∗
F ,t +CF ,t + n I
∗
F ,t + IF ,t + nG
∗
t
= n (C∗F ,t + I
∗
F ,t +G
∗
t +EX
∗
t ) (2.84)
where per capita exports by the Home and Foreign Country are respectively given
by
EXt ≡ nC∗H,t + nI∗H,t
= n(1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t + n(1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t (2.85)
EX∗t ≡ CF ,t/n+ IF ,t/n
= (1−wC)/n
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct + (1−wI)/n
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI
It (2.86)
Nominal trade balance in the Home and Foreign blocs are respectively
Pt TBt = St P
∗O
n Y
O + PH,tYt − PtCt − P It It − PH,tGt
= St P
∗O
n Y
O + PH,tYt − PH,tCH,t − PF ,tCF ,t − PH,tIH,t − PF ,tIF ,t − PH,tGt
(2.87)
P ∗t TB
∗
t = P
∗
F ,tY
∗
t − P ∗t C∗t − P I
∗
t I
∗
t − P ∗F ,tG∗t
= P ∗F ,tY
∗
t − P ∗F ,tC∗F ,t − P ∗H,tC∗H,t − P ∗F ,tI∗F ,t − P ∗H,tI∗H,t − P ∗F ,tG∗t
(2.88)
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Then combining (2.83)–(2.84) and (2.87)-(2.88) we have
Pt TBt = St P
∗O
n Y
O + PH,t n (C
∗
H,t + I
∗
H,t)− PF ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t)
= St Y
O P ∗O + PH,tEXt − PF ,tnEX∗t (2.89)
P ∗t TB
∗
t = P
∗
F ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t)/n− P ∗H,t(C∗H,t + I∗H,t)
= P ∗F ,tEX
∗
t − P ∗H,tEXt/n (2.90)
denominated in units of H and F currency respectively for the two blocs.
2.3.12 General n Case
For any 1 ≤ n < ∞ we can set up the model with output and trade equilibria
given by (2.83) – (2.88). Then using trade data we can calibrate wC , wI , w∗C
and w∗I in the steady state as follows: In the steady state write (2.88) in terms of
observable non-dimensional quantities as
TB
Y
=
PH
P
n (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H
P ∗
)−µ∗C C∗
Y
+
PH
P
n (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H
P I
∗
)−µ∗I I∗
Y
− PF
P
(1−wC)
(
PF
P
)−µC C
Y
− PF
P
(1−wI)
(
PF
P I
)−µI I
Y
+
RERY O P ∗O
Y
(2.91)
The first term on the rhs of (2.91) is the share consumption goods exports, excs
say. Given trade data for excs and letting n be the relative population size we can
then calibrate w∗C to hit excs. Similarly we can calibrate w∗I to hit the share of
investment goods exports, the second term on the rhs of (2.91) exis say.
The third and fourth terms on the rhs of (2.91) are the shares of consumption
and investment goods imports. Let these be imcs and imis respectively and they
can be used to calibrate wC and wI in a similar fashion.
The last term (exco) is the share commodity revenue with respect to non-oil
nominal GDP, we need to calibrate exogenous and fixed commodity output Y O to
hit an extra target of exco. But letting tb = TBY we must have from (2.91) that
tb = excs+ exis− imcs− imis+ exco (2.92)
Thus our trade data and trade balance data must be chosen to satisfy (2.92).
We can also calibrate A∗/A to hit the per capita GDP ratios of the F and H
blocs using the correct prices, namely
(
StP
∗
FY
∗
PHY
)
=
(
PFY
∗
PHY
)
=
(T Y ∗
Y
)
, and β/β∗ to
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hit tb. Thus given n (the relative population size) we can calibrate six parameters,
w∗C , w∗I , wC , wI , A∗/A and β∗/β to hit six targets obtained from data: excs, exis,
imcs, imis, the GDP ratio and tb.
To set initial values for w∗C , w∗I , wC , wI in fsolve, we can use an approximation
when T = 1. Then for w∗C we can use:
excs = n(1−w∗C)
C∗
Y
= n(1−w∗C)
C∗
Y ∗
Y ∗
Y
(2.93)
Then use the steady state value for C
∗
Y ∗ for the symmetric case of weights all
equal to 0.5, Y
∗
Y is the GDP ratio target and n the relative population size is a
parameter. Similarly for the other three weights.
2.3.13 Calibrating the four Bias Weights, exogenous and fixed commodity
output, β∗/β, A∗/A
We set the six target parameters tb, excs, exis, imcs, imis, exco and Y ∗/Y , based
on our data. We then solve for w∗C , w∗I , wC , wI , β∗/β, A∗/A and Y O to hit target
trade ratios excs, exis, imcs, imis, tb, GDP ratio Y ∗/Y and exco.
excs = PH
P
n (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H
P ∗
)−µ∗C C∗
Y
exis = PH
P
n (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H
P I
∗
)−µ∗I I∗
Y
imcs = PF
P
(1−wC)
(
PF
P
)−µC C
Y
imis = PF
P
(1−wI)
(
PF
P I
)−µI I
Y
exco = RERP
∗O Y O
Y
tb = TB
Y
Y ∗/Y = T Y
∗
Y
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2.3.14 Closed ROW-SOE Special Case
Now consider the ROW-SOE case as n→∞ and w∗C → 1 and w∗I → 1. Then for
the F-bloc:
EX∗t =
CF ,t
n
+
IF ,t
n
→ 0 as n→∞ (2.94)
TB∗t = P
∗
F ,tEX
∗
t − P ∗H,tEXt/n→ 0 as n→∞ (2.95)
Hence the ROW becomes a closed economy bloc. But TBt 6= 0 and is given by
TBt =
PH,t
Pt
EXt − PF ,t
Pt
nEX∗t +RERt P
∗O
t Y
O
=
PH,t
Pt
n (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t +
PH,t
Pt
n (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t
− PF ,t
Pt
(1−wC)
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct − PF ,t
Pt
(1−wI)
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI
It
+ RERt P
∗O
t Y
O (2.96)
Thus as n → ∞ TB∗t → 0, but at the same time w∗C → 1 and w∗I → 1 with
n (1−w∗C) and n (1−w∗I) remaining non-zero. Hence TBt 6= 0. From the steady
state below, now with all prices equal to unity (and therefore the terms of trade
also unity), we have a set-up with the ROW as closed economy and in the home
country n(1− w∗C) replaced with excsC∗/Y and n(1− w∗I ) replaced with exisI∗/Y (see
steady state (A.5)–(E.95)). Then as before in the calibration imcs, imis, tb and
Y ∗/Y are set equal to targets found from data.
2.3.15 Summary of changes in the Dynamic Calibrated Two-bloc Model
for (Closed ROW-SOE Case)
We replace the following
TB∗t =
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
EX∗t −
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
EXt
n
EX∗t =
CFt
n
+
IFt
n
EXt = nCH
∗
t + n IH
∗
t
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with the following
TB∗t = 0
EX∗t = 0
EXt =
targexcs
C∗/Y
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)µ∗C
C∗t +
targexis
I∗/Y
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗I,t
)µ∗I
I∗t
2.3.16 Imperfect Exchange Rate Pass-Through: DCP with LCP Ex-
porters only in H Bloc
We must now distinguish the price setting in domestic and foreign markets. We
assume that the F bloc are producer currency prices, but in the H bloc the prices of
goods sold domestically, CH,t+ IH,t+Gt, are set in domestic currency, while those
exported, C∗H,t + I∗H,t, are invoiced in foreign currency. This is the Dominant
Currency Pricing Case (DCP) with the currency in the F-bloc dominant.
For goods sold domestically the (corrected) inflation dynamics are given by:
1 = ξ (ΠH,t−1,t)ζ−1 + (1− ξ)
(
JJH,t
JH,t
)1−ζ
∆t = ξ (ΠH,t−1,t)
ζ ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
JJH,t
JH,t
)−ζ
JJH,t =
ζ
ζ − 1
PH,t
Pt
(CH,t + IH,t +Gt)MStMCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)
ζ
JJH,t+1
]
JH,t =
PH,t
Pt
(CH,t + IH,t +Gt) + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)
ζ−
JH,t+1
]
MCt =
PWt
PH,t
Denoting the optimal price at time t for exported good m as P ∗OH,t (m) in F
currency, the firms allowed to re-optimize prices maximise real (consumption price)
expected discounted profits by solving
max
POt (m)
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξk
Λt,t+k
Pt+k
(C∗t+k(m) + I
∗
t+k(m))
[
St+kP
∗O
H,t (m)− PWt+k
]
(2.97)
subject to the demand schedule, which now becomes
C∗t+k(m) + I
∗
t+k(m) =
P ∗OH,t (m)
P ∗H,t+k
−ζ (C∗t+k + I∗t+k) (2.98)
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Substituting in this demand schedule, taking first-order conditions with respect
the new price and rearranging leads to
P ∗OH,t =
ζ
ζ − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k
Pt+k
(
P ∗H,t+k
)ζ
(C∗t+k + I
∗
t+k)P
W
t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k
Pt+k
(
P ∗H,t+k
)ζ
(C∗t+k + I
∗
t+k)
(2.99)
where the m index is dropped as all firms face the same marginal cost so the
right-hand side of the equation is independent of firm size or price history.
Now note that the real (own exported good price) marginal cost for each retailer
is given by
MC∗H,t ≡
PWt
StP ∗H,t
=
MCt
PH,t
Pt
St P ∗H,t
Pt
(2.100)
We can now write the fraction (2.99)
P ∗OH,t
P ∗H,t
=
ζ
ζ − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k
(
Π∗H,t,t+k
)ζ (P ∗H,t+kSt+k
Pt+k
)
(C∗t+k + I
∗
t+k)MC
∗
H,t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 ξ
kΛt,t+k
(
Π∗t,t+k
)ζ−1 (St+kP ∗H,t+k
Pt+k
)
(C∗H,t+k + I
∗
H,t+k))
(2.101)
Denoting the numerator and denominator by JJ∗H,t and J∗H,t respectively, and
introducing a mark-up shock MSt to MCt, we write in recursive form
P
∗O
H,t
P ∗H,t
=
JJ∗H,t
J∗H,t
JJ∗H,t − ξβEt[Π∗H,t,t+1ζJJ∗H,t+1] =
1
1− 1ζ
StP
∗
H,t
Pt
(C∗H,t+k + I
∗
H,t+k)UC,tMC
∗
H,tMSt
J∗H,t − ξβEt[Π∗H,t,t+1ζ−1J∗H,t+1] =
StP
∗
H,t
Pt
(C∗H,t+k + I
∗
H,t+k)UC,t
Using the aggregate producer price index PH,t and the fact that all resetting firms
will choose the same price, by the Law of Large Numbers we can find the evolution
of the price index as given by
P ∗H,t
1−ζ = ξP ∗H,t−1
1−ζ + (1− ξ)
(
P ∗OH,t
)1−ζ
(2.102)
which can be written in the form required
1 = ξ
(
Π∗H,t−1,t
)ζ−1
+ (1− ξ)
P ∗OH,t
PH,t
1−ζ (2.103)
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Origin of Good Domestic Market Export Market
Home PH,t P ∗H 6= PHSt
Foreign P ∗F P ∗F =
PF
St
Table 2.3: Notation for Prices
Foreign exporters from the large ROW bloc are PCPers so we have
PF ,t = StP
∗
F ,t (2.104)
As before, define the terms of trade for the home bloc (import/export prices in
one currency) as Tt ≡ PF ,tPH,t . Define the terms of trade for the foreign bloc as T ∗t ≡
P ∗H,t
P ∗F ,t
. With PCPers only the law of one price holds and T ∗t =
StP
∗
H,t
StP ∗F ,t
=
PH,t
PF ,t
= 1Tt ,
but with DCPers this no longer is the case. Now we have that
T ∗t ≡
P ∗H,t
P ∗F ,t
=
P ∗H,t/PH,t
P ∗F ,t/PH,t
=
1
Tt
P ∗H,tSt
PH,t
=
1
Tt
St P
∗
H,t
Pt
PH,t
Pt
(2.105)
Hence in (2.102) we can write StP
∗
H,t
Pt
=
StP
∗
H,t
PH,tPt/PH,t
= TtT
∗
t
Pt/PH,t
or alternatively
from (2.100) we have T ∗t Tt = MCtMC∗H,t which completes the set-up.
Table 2.3 summarizes the notation used.
Whilst the distribution of prices is not required to track the evolution of the
aggregate price index, (2.110) below implies a loss of output due to dispersion in
prices. Using the demand schedules, we can write the price dispersion that gives
the average loss in output as
∆H,t =
1
M
M∑
m=1
(
PH,t (m)
PH,t
)−ζ
(2.106)
∆∗H,t =
1
M
M∑
m=1
(
P ∗H,t (m)
P ∗H,t
)−ζ
(2.107)
for firms m = 1, ...,M . It is not possible to track all Pt(m) but as it is known that
a proportion 1− ξ of firms will optimise prices in period t, and from the Law of
Large Numbers, that the distribution of non-optimised prices will be the same in
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as the overall distribution. Therefore, price dispersion can be written as a law of
motion
∆H,t = ξ(ΠH,t−1,t)ζ∆H,t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
JJH,t
JH,t
)−ζ
(2.108)
∆∗H,t = ξ(Π
∗
H,t−1,t)
ζ∆∗H,t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
JJ∗H,t
J∗H,t
)−ζ
(2.109)
Using this, aggregate final output is divided between exports EXt = C∗H,t + I∗H,t
and domestic consumption Yt −EXt = CH,t + IH,t +Gt. Then allowing for dis-
persion we have
Yt =
 EXtYt
∆∗H,t
+
(
1− EXtYt
)
∆H,t
YWt (2.110)
Note that as the law of one price does not hold anymore so equation 2.65 will be
considered as following:
P ∗t TB
∗
t = P
∗
F ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t)− P ∗H,t(C∗H,t + I∗H,t) (2.111)
2.3.17 Traded Intermediate Goods
We generalize Casas et al. (2017) to include capital and trade in investment goods.
In this section, we additionally allow for intermediate inputs in production. Both
are important channels for the effect of exchange rate changes on the supply side,
but the intermediate goods channel is more direct. Moreover, a large proportion
of trade is in intermediate goods as mentioned in Bergholt (2015).
Modelling trade in intermediate inputs, Mt, is analogous to investment goods
with
Mt = M
DS(wM ,µM ,MH,t,MF ,t) ≡
[
w
1
µM
M M
µM−1
µM
I,t + (1−wM )
1
µMM
µM−1
µM
F ,t
] µM
µM−1
(2.112)
PMt = P
DS(wM ,µM ,MH,t,MF ,t) ≡
[
wM P 1−µMH,t + (1−wM )P 1−µMF ,t
] 1
1−µM (2.113)
PtMt = PH,tMH,t + PF ,tMF ,t (2.114)
Then the production technology in the Home country (2.66) becomes:
YWt =F (At,Ht,Kt−1,Mt) = (AtHt)αHK
αK
t−1M
1−αH−αK
t (2.115)
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The foc by wholesale firms for Mt is then
PWt FM =
αMP
W
t Y
W
t
Mt
= PMt (2.116)
Hence
Mt =
αMP
W
t Y
W
t
PMt
=
αMP
W
t /PH,t YWt
PMt /PH,t
=
αMMCtY
W
t
PMt /PH,t
(2.117)
and similar to (2.14) and (2.15)
MH,t = wM
(
PH,t
PMt
)−µM
Mt (2.118)
MF ,t = (1−wM )
(
PF ,t
PMt
)−µM
Mt (2.119)
where similar to (2.33) and (2.34)
PMt
PH,t
=
(
wM + (1−wM )T 1−µMt
) 1
1−µM (2.120)
PMt
PF ,t
=
(
wMT µM−1t + (1−wM )
) 1
1−µM (2.121)
The output equilibria in two blocs (2.83) and (2.84) now become
Yt = CH,t + nC
∗
H,t + IH,t + n I
∗
H,t +MH,t + nM
∗
H,t +Gt
= CH,t + IH,t +Gt +EXt (2.122)
nY ∗t = nC
∗
F ,t +CF ,t + n I
∗
F ,t + IF ,t ++nM
∗
F ,t +MF ,t + nG
∗
t
= n (C∗F ,t + I
∗
F ,t +G
∗
t +EX
∗
t ) (2.123)
where per capita exports by the Home and Foreign Country are respectively given
by
EXt ≡ nC∗H,t + nI∗H,t + nM∗H,t
= n(1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t + n(1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t + (1−w∗M )
(
P ∗H,t
PM
∗
t
)−µ∗M
M∗t
(2.124)
EX∗t ≡ CF ,t/n+ IF ,t/n+MF ,t/n
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= (1−wC)/n
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct + (1−wI)/n
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI
It (2.125)
+ (1−wM )/n
(
PF ,t
PMt
)−µM
Mt
Nominal trade balance in the Home and Foreign blocs are now respectively
Pt TBt = PH,tYt − PtCt − P It It − PMt Mt − PH,tGt
= PH,tYt − PH,tCH,t − PF ,tCF ,t − PH,tIH,t − PF ,tIF ,t − PH,tMH,t
− PF ,tMF ,t − PH,tGt (2.126)
P ∗t TB
∗
t = P
∗
F ,tY
∗
t − P ∗t C∗t − P I
∗
t I
∗
t − PM
∗
t M
∗
t − P ∗F ,tG∗t
= P ∗F ,tY
∗
t − P ∗F ,tC∗F ,t − P ∗H,tC∗H,t − P ∗F ,tI∗F ,t − P ∗H,tI∗H,t
− P ∗F ,tM∗F ,t − P ∗H,tM∗H,t − P ∗F ,tG∗t (2.127)
Then combining (2.122)–(2.123) and (2.126)-(2.127) we have
Pt TBt = PH,t n (C
∗
H,t + I
∗
H,t +M
∗
H,t)− PF ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t +MF ,t)
= PH,tEXt − PF ,tnEX∗t (2.128)
P ∗t TB
∗
t = P
∗
F ,t(CF ,t + IF ,t +MF ,t)/n− P ∗H,t(C∗H,t + I∗H,t +M∗H,t)
= P ∗F ,tEX
∗
t − P ∗H,tEXt/n (2.129)
denominated in units of H and F currency respectively for the two blocs.
For any 1 ≤ n <∞ we can set up the model with output and trade equilibria
given by (2.122) – (2.127) with TBt given by
TBt =
PH,t
Pt
EXt − PF ,t
Pt
nEX∗t
=
PH,t
Pt
n (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t +
PH,t
Pt
n (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t
+
PH,t
Pt
n (1−w∗M )
(
P ∗H,t
PM
∗
t
)−µ∗M
M∗t
− PF ,t
Pt
(1−wC)
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct − PF ,t
Pt
(1−wI)
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI
It
PF ,t
Pt
(1−wM )
(
PF ,t
PMt
)−µM
Mt
(2.130)
Then using trade data we can calibrate wC , wI , wM , w∗C , w∗I and w∗M in the
steady state as follows: In the steady state without loss of generality by a choice
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of output units we can put all prices equal to unity. Then we can write (2.130) in
terms of observable non-dimensional quantities as
TB
Y
≡ tb
=
(
n (1−w∗C)
C∗
Y ∗
+ n (1−w∗I + n (1−w∗M )
M∗
Y ∗
)
Y ∗
Y
− (1−wC)C
Y
− (1−wI) I
Y
− (1−wM )M
Y
≡ excs+ exis+ exims− imcs− imis− imims (2.131)
The first term on the rhs of (2.131) is the share consumption goods exports, excs
say. Given trade data for excs and letting n be the relative population size we
can then calibrate w∗C to hit excs. Similarly we can calibrate w∗I and w∗M to hit
the share of investment goods exports, the second and third terms on the rhs of
(2.131) exis, exims say.
The fourth, fifth and sixth terms on the rhs of (2.131) are the shares of con-
sumption, investment and intermediate goods imports. Let these be imcs, imis
and imims respectively and they can be used to calibrate wC , wI and wM in a
similar fashion.
Closed ROW-SOE Special Case
But now consider the ROW-SOE case as n → ∞ and w∗C → 1, w∗I → 1 and
w∗M → 1. Then for the F-bloc:
EX∗t =
CF ,t
n
+
IF ,t
n
+
MF ,t
n
→ 0 as n→∞ (2.132)
TB∗t = P
∗
F ,tEX
∗
t − P ∗H,tEXt/n→ 0 as n→∞ (2.133)
Hence the ROW becomes a closed economy bloc, but TBt 6= 0. Then in (2.131)
in the home country n(1− w∗C) is replaced with excsC∗/Y , n(1− w∗I ) replaced with
exis
I∗/Y , and n(1−w∗M ) replaced with eximM∗/Y .
2.4 method of estimation
This section describes our data, calibration approach, and presents a brief dis-
cussion of the prior distribution and identification of parameters. We have also
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summarized the separated estimation of oil price shock. In order to evaluate the
performance of the model, we use a combination of calibrated and estimated pa-
rameters.
For the purpose of estimating the models, the steady state equation are based
on a non-zero inflation steady state (Π > 1). This is done using Dynare for
the estimation of our model. In the Appendices the steady state of the model is
described.
2.4.1 Data
To estimate the model, we use quarterly information on seven key variables for
Canada and Mexico: GDP, consumption, investment, consumer price index (CPI),
nominal exchange rate, nominal interest rate, and oil price. The sample runs from
QII:1993 to QII:2017 to compute posterior distributions and marginal likelihood
values. Quarterly crude Oil price is obtained from FRED Economic Data. Other
quarterly data are from FRED Economic Data and and other sources.10 Real
investment and real consumption obtained by deflating using the consumer price
index (CPI) and for real Oil price, we have used consumer price index of USA . We
compute quarter to quarter output growth, consumption growth and investment
growth, nominal exchange rate growth, and oil price growth as log difference of
real series and multiply the growth rates by 100 to convert them into percentages.
Inflation rates are defined as log differences of the consuming price index (CPI)
and converted into percentages. All variables are seasonally adjusted except the
exchange rate and interest rate.
2.4.2 Calibrated Parameters
We use a combination of calibration and estimation methods. We calibrate the
parameters that affect the steady-state of the model. The calibration values follow
the standard values reported in the literature for small open economy models and
10 Table 9 and 10 in the appendix provides a complete list of sources.
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emerging economies. The remaining parameters are estimated using Bayesian
methods.
Tables (2.4.2) and (2.4.2) summarize the calibrated values of parameter in our
model, at a quarterly frequency for Mexico and Canada, where we calibrate a set
of parameters, and the steady state values for some endogenous variables, which
characterise the model economy. Our calibration strategy aims to match, as
accurately as possible, the empirical evidence and available data on key statistics
of these two economies. Each period is assumed to correspond to a quarter.
As in much of the literature, the depreciation rate of capital, δ , is set at 10 per
cent per annum, implying a quarterly value of 0.025. Home discount rate is set at
β = 0.99. This value is consistent with the quarterly estimates of discount factor
for Pakistan economy as given in Ahmed et al. (2012). In the studies of Gabriel
et al. (2010), Khera (2016) and Anand and Khera (2016) for India and Haider
et al. (2012) for Pakistan and Batini et al. (2011) for emerging economies β is set
at 0.9823, 0.994, 0.994, 0.991 and 0.9881 respectively.
For risk aversion parameter (σR), Tabova (2009) estimates a value of 2.00 for
middle-income countries and Gabriel et al. (2010) estimate a value of 1.99. In line
with this literature, we assume the value of 2.00 for Ricardian risk aversion.
The substitution elasticity between imported and home goods (µC), following
previous emerging economy estimates in the literature that range from 1.07 to
2.50 in Castillo et al. (2008) for Peru, 0.6 in Medina et al. (2005) for Chile, 1.45
in Gabriel et al. (2010) for India, 1.15 and 1.20 in Khera (2016) for South Africa
and India respectively and 1.50 in Batini et al. (2011) for emerging economies,
we calibrate it at a value of 1.50 and following Medina et al. (2005), Chang et al.
(2015) and Adler et al. (2016), export elasticity demand, µ∗C and µ∗I , is set to 1.50.
In terms of the elasticity of substitution among different retail varieties, Khera
(2016) and Gabriel et al. (2010), estimate it in India equal to 7.12 and 7.02. Thus,
we adopt a mean of 7 for (ζ).
In addition to the above ’standard’ parametrisation values reported in the
literature for small open economy models and emerging economies, we endeavour
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to calibrate the investigated countries specifically to closely characterise them.
We do this using a specific averaged time-series data from these countries.
We calibrate share of the trade targets using two time-series (i.e. trade data from
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data and GDP from the World Bank
data). We added the value of the intermediate goods to the GDP (i.e. the total
value of intermediate goods in exports and imports) before dividing the different
shares by this new value to obtain the shares receptively.
On the oil targets, we calibrate share of oil production (as % of GDP). The way
this is computed is as an average oil production multiplied by oil price and then
divided by GDP. Based on this, we have calibrated this as 0.0568 for Canada and
0.0677 for Mexico.
As for the tax on oil production, which is one of the targets that were not easy to
get data on (given the complexity of the tax system and having multiple taxes
(Royalties, Corporate income tax, and Province tax, etc). We use Corporate
income tax as a proxy for this.11 We calibrate this as 15% for Canada and 30%
for Mexico.
For government expenditure (gy), we used the General government final consump-
tion expenditure (current US dollar) divided by GDP using data from the World
Bank. Based on this, we set an average of 21% and 11% for government share of
production (gy), in Canada and Mexico respectively.
As for the three factors of production (namely: labour, capital, and intermediate
inputs) we find that in the literature there is no consensus on the right ratio,
especially in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function. We use 70:30
labour: capital share in value-added for all three countries (i.e. Canada, Mexico,
and the USA). Moreover, we assigned 30% as the share of intermediate inputs in
the production.
11 We adopted the values from Ernst and Young 2019 Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide
https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide—country-list.
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Calibrated/Imposed parameter Symbol Value
Foreign Discount factor β∗ 0.99
Depreciation rate δ∗ 0.025
Hours worked H∗ 1/3
Preference parameter %∗ calibrated so H∗=1/3
Government spending g∗y 0.15
Table 2.4: Calibrated Parameters for Foreign Bloc (US)
Rule-of-thumb Consumers: this is an assumption that assumes there are two
types of households as in our model; one type is an agent who has access to
financial markets and a second agent who faces liquidity constrained. Many of the
previous papers and literature follows Campbell and Mankiw (1989) paper which
assumes that 50% of US HHs are liquidity constrained. Other cited a lower value
for the US which varies from 16% to 33% - in the appendix we include details of
the values reported in different studies. We calibrated these as 33%, 23%, and
40% for the USA, Canada, and Mexico respectively.
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Calibrated/Imposed parameter Symbol Value
Home Discount factor β 0.99
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Risk aversion σ 2.00
Labour share in Canada α 0.50
Labour share in Mexico α 0.50
Share of intermediate inputs in production in Canada α 0.30
Share of intermediate inputs in production in Mexico α 0.30
Hours worked H 1/3
Preference parameter % calibrated so H=1/3
Risk premium elasticity φB 0.001
Price Substitution elasticity (Others) ζ 7.00
Substitution elasticity (Home/Foreign goods) µC = µI 1.50
Foreign Substitution elasticity (Export/Foreign goods) µC∗ = µI∗ 1.50
Standard deviation of shocks σi 1.00
Government spending in Canada gy 0.21
Government spending in Mexico gy 0.11
Oil taxation rate in Canada τo 0.15
Oil taxation rate in Mexico τo 0.30
Home Bloc Exported share of Investment in Canada 1−wI calibrated so exis=0.0580
Home Bloc Exported share of Consumption in Canada 1−wC calibrated so excs=0.0782
Home Bloc Exported share of Intermediate in Canada 1−wM calibrated so exims=0.0668
Foreign Bloc Imported share of Investment in Canada 1−w∗I calibrated so imis=0.0941
Foreign Bloc Imported share of Consumption in Canada 1−w∗C calibrated so imcs=0.0780
Home Bloc Imported share of Intermediate in Canada 1−w∗M calibrated so imims=0.0636
Oil output in Canada Y O calibrated so exco=0.0568
Home Bloc Exported share of Investment in Mexico 1−wI calibrated so exis=0.094
Home Bloc Exported share of Consumption in Mexico 1−wC calibrated so excs=0.0783
Home Bloc Exported share of Intermediate in Mexico 1−wM calibrated so exims=0.0230
Foreign Bloc Imported share of Investment in Mexico 1−w∗I calibrated so imis=0.1051
Foreign Bloc Imported share of Consumption in Mexico 1−w∗C calibrated so imcs=0.0663
Home Bloc Imported share of Intermediate in Mexico 1−w∗M calibrated so imims=0.0599
Oil output in Mexico Y O calibrated so exco=0.0677
Foreign productivity in Canada A∗ calibrated so Y ∗/Y=1.22
Foreign productivity in Mexico A∗ calibrated so Y ∗/Y=5.56
Table 2.5: Calibrated or Imposed Parameters for Home Bloc (Canada, Mexico)
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2.4.3 Bayesian Estimation
We estimate the model using a Bayesian approach with Dynare. As our model is a
two block (ROW and SOE) economy, we need to have the ROW block estimated
first and then call the posterior means of estimated parameters for the estimation
of small open economy. We estimate directly the non-linear ROW model using the
US dataset. As our aim is the specification of SOE model, so here we concentrate
on the SOE estimation.
2.4.4 Estimation of Oil Price Shock
According to the commodity section, the price of oil (P ∗O,t) has an exogenous
process in the model, so we estimate the standard deviation of this shock separately
by fitting an AR(1) process and then impose the estimated coefficient and standard
deviation to the model as the level of shock persistence in parameter block and as
the standard deviation in shock block respectively:
Dependent Variable: Oil
Method: Least Squares
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Oil(-1) 0.329148 0.098172 3.374729 0.0011
S.E. of regression 12.91004
Table 2.6: Estimation of Oil Price Shock
2.4.5 Prior distribution
In order to implement Bayesian estimation, it is first necessary to define prior
distributions for the estimated parameters. The choice of priors for the estimated
parameters is usually determined by theoretical restrictions (e.g. non-negativity,
probabilities bounded between 0 and 1, etc) and evidence from previous studies.
Table A.4 and A.5 (columns 1 to 4) lists the prior distribution along with the prior
mean and standard deviation of all the estimated parameters. For risk aversion
parameter of non-Ricardian household (σC), in line with the literature to calibrate
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the Ricardian risk aversion parameter, we assume a normal distribution, with the
prior mean of 2 and a standard deviation of 0.25.
Following Gabriel et al. (2010), the prior for proportion of rule of thumb (RT)
consumers, we assume normal distribution with mean of 0.5 and standard deviation
of 0.05.
To ensure that the consumption habit persistence, χ, is bounded between 0 and 1,
we assign a beta distribution, previous studies show mixed evidence regarding its
value for developing countries. Castillo et al. (2008) estimate a large value in the
range of 0.7 to 0.9 for Peru, whereas smaller values of 0.24 are estimated for India
in Khera (2016). So we assign it a mean of 0.75, with a standard deviation of 0.1.
The prior for price indexation parameters are chosen the same as beta distribution
with mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.15.
We assume a normal distribution of mean 2 and standard deviation of 1.5 for
investment adjustment cost (φI) based on the calibrated values in Khera (2016)
and Gabriel et al. (2010).
Previous estimates of central bank’s weight on inflation in the Taylor-rule, ranges
from 1.27 in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) to 2.5 and 1.5 in Gabriel et al. (2010)
and Khera (2016) respectively. In order to include these values within the 95 per
cent confidence band, we assign a normal prior with a mean of 1.5 and standard
deviation of 0.25 to θΠ. For the feedback parameter on GDP (θy) , GDP growth
θdy and depreciation rate (θds), we assume normal distribution of mean 0.10 and
standard deviation of .05 .
The lagged monetary policy coefficient (ρM ), shows mixed results in the previous
estimates. Castillo et al. (2008) find it to be 0.4 for Peru, whereas Gabriel et al.
(2010) estimate significantly higher values of 0.8 for India. Based on these studies,
a beta distribution with mean of 0.75 and standard deviation of 0.1 is assigned to
ρM .
Regarding the priors for the parameters relating to shock processes, we use a beta
distribution for the persistence of all shocks, where the mean is set at 0.5 with a
standard deviation of 0.10. Given the lack of evidence regarding the sources of
business cycle fluctuations, we adopt uninformative inverse-gamma distributions
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for standard deviations of all shocks, with prior mean of 0.10 along with a standard
deviation of 2.00.
2.4.6 Identification Analysis
Fig. A.26-A.29 show the results of the identification tool provided by Dynare.
Parameter identifiability gives an indication of the informativeness of the estimate,
and is important for making sensible and meaningful inferences. All the figures
show that all parameters are identified, and are listed from left to right with
increasing degree of identification strength.
2.5 empirical results
2.5.1 Posterior Estimates
Tables A.4 and A.5 (column 5), states the posterior means of the Bayesian
estimation along with the 95% confidence intervals. Overall, the parameter
estimates are plausible. The economy has higher values for the volatility of
shocks, which is consistent with the literature regarding open economies being
more volatile in general. Below, we provide a detailed description of posterior
estimates in the model.
Regarding the Calvo price stickiness, there is a significant difference between the
two price regimes. Totally, in the models of DCP, Calvo price stickiness has a
higher estimated value in comparison with the PCP models, in which is estimated
to be more flexible. This signifies the importance of imperfect exchange rate
pass-through setting.
Looking at price indexation parameters estimates, the estimation indicates that
in the Canada model relative to Mexico the prices are less indexed to last period’s
aggregate inflation. The posterior mean estimate for investment adjustment cost
is higher under DCP relative to PCP models in case of Mexico.
Overall, we observe high estimated values for the standard deviation of some of
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the estimated shocks in case of Mexico relative to Canada. These shocks are
markup, investment, and terms of trade relative to other shocks in the economy
(in case of PCP Mexico instead of Markup it include government expenditures
shock), which ranges from 3 to 11. The same is in Canada but with more modest
ranging between 0.11 and 1.3. The high values which are estimated for the
standard deviation of shocks might be due to the data of the economy which is
highly vulnerable to different shocks.
2.5.2 Testing for Convergence of MCMC
The multivariate diagnostics shown in figure A.30-A.33 indicate that the chains
converge to similar means and distributions - Interval refers to the interval measure,
and m2, m3 refer to second and third order multivariate moment measures.
2.6 model evaluation
2.6.1 Model Fit to the Data
Can the model capture the underlying characteristics of the actual data? In this
section to further illustrate how the estimated model captures the data statis-
tics and persistence Bayesian estimation and validation of model in particular,
we obtain the model-generated moments based on actual data (i.e. posterior dis-
tribution) and compute these model-implied statistics by solving the models at
the posterior means obtained from estimation. After that we perform a variance
decomposition exercise and finally, we analyse the business cycle implications of
these features, by comparing the estimated posterior impulse responses to exoge-
nous shocks across all specifications. It is worth mentioning that in our estimation
we have employed the Dynare’s command of endogenous prior a la Christiano et al.
(2011). The method is inspired by sequential Bayesian learning and it is suggested
to improve the second moments fit.
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Standard Moment Criteria
In tables A.7 and A.8, the results of the models’ second moments are compared
with the second moments in the actual data to evaluate the models’ empirical
performance for Canada and Mexico in the two cases of PCP and DCP. In terms
of the standard deviations, the model is able to reproduce acceptable volatility for
the main variables of the DSGE model, however relatively high volatility compared
to the actual data. Tables A.7 and A.8 also reports the cross-correlations of the six
observable variables vis-à-vis output. The model does roughly well at capturing
the contemporaneous correlations observed in the data. In order to illustrate
more how the estimated model captures the data statistics, figures A.34 and A.35
show autocorrelations of the data and the model. Figure A.36-A.39 depicts the
mean responses corresponding to a positive one standard deviation monetary policy
shock between different price regimes in each country and cross countries.
Mexico DCP Mexico PCP
LLs (1st stage) -885.969271 -2162.84179
prob. 1.0000 0.0000
LLs (2nd stage) -893.075043 -2196.046506
prob. 1.0000 0.0000
Table 2.7: Marginal Log-likelihood Values & Posterior Mexico Model
Canada DCP Canada PCP
LLs (1st stage) -27432.866195 -30892.211852
prob. 1.0000 0.0000
LLs (2nd stage) -27312.775219 -30864.218345
prob. 1.0000 0.0000
Table 2.8: Marginal Log-likelihood Values & Posterior Canada Model
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2.6.2 Variance Decomposition of Business Cycle Fluctuations
What are the driving forces of the observed business cycle fluctuations? What
are the impacts of the structural shocks on the main macroeconomic time series?
To address these questions we examine the contribution of each of the structural
shocks to the variance of endogenous variables in the model, i.e. the underlying
sources of fluctuations, which explains how important a shock is in business cycle
dynamics.
Overall, the results of the variance decomposition (presented in table A.9-A.12)
are comparable with results reported in the wider business cycle literature for
small open economies. The most significant observation - in all models of different
pricing regimes - is the considerable role of foreign monetary policy shock in
explaining the dynamics of the model relative to other forces even in comparison
with the domestic drivers (with an exception of the variation in consumption in
case of Mexico under dominant currency pricing which largely explained by price
markup). The second noticeable result is the disturbances from the domestic
price markup shock, which is the most important at explaining the dynamics
of the endogenous variables in the model under the dominant currency pricing
regime in comparison to its negligible disturbances in the models with producer
currency pricing. It is followed by the terms of trade and investment shocks
in Mexico and technology shock in Canada. These are followed by a relatively
smaller contribution by the domestic monetary policy, government expenditure,
commodity price, and other foreign shocks.
The variation in total output is mainly explained by foreign monetary policy,
domestic price markup, terms of trade, and technology shocks. The role of other
shocks is relatively very small. Aggregate consumption follows a similar pattern
with more role for domestic price markup, government spending, and terms
of trade shocks specially in case of Mexico under DCP and PCP respectively.
Movements in the investment are as well mostly explained by foreign monetary
policy shock followed by domestic investment and markup shocks (particularly in
the case of Mexico under DCP).
Variation in inflation is explained as well mainly by foreign monetary policy
shock with smaller percentage explained by terms of trade in Mexico in case of
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(pcp) and dominant currency pricing (dcp)
DCP. Finally, the movement in the interest rate and exchange rate are primarily
explained by foreign monetary policy shock.
In sum, in the model economy the key contribution to the variation in the
endogenous variables in the economy is by the foreign monetary policy shock
which dominates in the variance decomposition matrix and the contrast between
the two models of pricing is best explained with the price markup shock which
plays an important role in the VDM matrix in DCP models.
2.7 comparison of results for producer
currency pricing (pcp) and domi-
nant currency pricing (dcp)
In the following, we show the reaction of key macroeconomic variables to a mon-
etary policy shock under the different pricing systems (i.e. producer currency
pricing and dominant currency pricing) and between the two case studies (Canada
and Mexico). As the impulse responses show, there are different implications for
inflation, and the volume of export and import under the various currency pricing
system and across countries.
Figures A.20-A.23 plot the impulse response to a positive one percent exogenous
increase in domestic and foreign interest rates. In each plot, we contrast the re-
sponse under the regimes of DCP and PCP in Canada and Mexico.
Exchange rate and Inflation: In response to a shock to the domestic monetary
policy, domestic interest rate increases and the exchange rate appreciates reduc-
ing inflationary pressures on the economy. This in turn, dampens the increase in
nominal interest rates via the monetary rule. As seen in Figure A.20-A.22 the
decrease in inflation in the case of PCP exceeds that of DCP since exchange rate
movements have a smaller impact on the domestic prices when export prices are
sticky in foreign currency. These results are in line with Casas et al. (2017).
Terms-of-Trade: The exchange rate appreciation is associated with an improve-
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ment of the terms-of-trade in both cases will slightly larger increase under DCP
regime. This result is the same in both countries.
Exports and Imports: After shocks to foreign monetary policy, the export quan-
tity under PCP increases considerably for the first 5 quarters [i.e. expenditure
switching effects] before it goes below zero for the next 10 quarters and then tends
to stay above its steady-state level for the remaining period. While under DCP
export quantity does not fluctuate that much though it ends up slightly increasing
above zero. Under both price regimes, imported quantity decreases as the relative
import price spikes.
Output: Comparing Figures A.20-A.23, the expansionary effect of an increase to
the foreign interest rate on output is almost muted under DCP relative to PCP.
The impulse response functions show that under PCP there is an expenditure
switching impact that gives rise to demand on the domestic output which is not
the case under DCP.
Cross Country Comparison: In both countries (and under both price regimes),
the movement of the main macroeconomic variables goes in the same direction;
output, inflation, interest rate, and exchange rate increase; while consumption,
investment decrease. The movement of the variables under PCP has a larger mag-
nitude than those under DCP (with the exception of consumption in the Canada
model). Regarding the main contributions of Casas et al. (2017), the estimated
model of Canada is the only model which is most in line with their findings.
Overall, the results under the PCP model to a large extent represent the text-book
Mundell-Fleming model in which a U.S. monetary tightening are expansionary to
the home economy. It also in line with the results Gourinchas (2018) reported in
the case of a strong financial spillover.
2.8 conclusions
In this study, we aim to present an analysis of the empirical relevance of imper-
fect exchange rate pass-through in the context of domestic and foreign monetary
policy. For this, we build a comprehensive two-country DSGE model with limited
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asset market participation which interacts with the rest of the world (ROW) in
a framework of new Keynesian model in two price regimes of PCP and DCP. We
also estimate our proposed models for different economies, the ROW model on
US data and SOE model on Canada, and Mexico data respectively using Bayesian
estimation techniques. This provides not only a better understanding on the conse-
quences of shocks that generate fluctuations in the exchange rate on different small
open economies, but also an interesting international comparison across countries
as well. Our findings can be summarized as follows.
First, the main result is that in a likelihood race DCP outperforms PCP for all
countries with a highly significant marginal likelihood differences.
Second, by analysing the variance decomposition of business cycle fluctuations,
the dominant role of foreign monetary shock in overall fluctuations is observed,
followed by the markup and terms of trade shocks.
Third, by the IRFs, we noticed that there are different implications for exchange
rate pass through, the terms-of-trade and the volume of export and import under
the different currency pricing regimes and across countries. Following the domestic
monetary shock, the variation in inflation in the case of PCP exceeds that of DCP,
since exchange rate movements have a smaller impact on the domestic prices when
export prices are sticky in foreign currency.
Regarding terms of trade, the exchange rate appreciation is associated with an
improvement of the terms-of-trade in both cases with slightly larger increase under
DCP regime. This result is the same in both countries. As for the export and
import quantity, we find that after a shock to foreign monetary policy, the export
quantity under PCP increases considerably for the first 5 quarters [i.e. expenditure
switching effects] before it goes below zero for the next 10 quarters and then tends
to stay above its steady-state level for the remaining period. While under DCP
export quantity does not fluctuate that much though it ends up slightly increasing
above zero. Under both price regimes, imported quantity decreases as the relative
import price spikes.
We also find that the inflation-output trade off in response to a monetary policy
shock worsens under DCP relative to PCP. That is, a monetary policy contraction
decreases inflation by much more than it reduces output, as compared to PCP.
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In sum, by cross country comparison of posterior estimated IRFs between our
two-case study, one can conclude that almost all the models are in line with the
main contributions of Casas et al. (2017) except for the stability property of the
terms of trade in the DCP economy.
Our future research would focus on examining the implications of these two
paradigms on the conduct of monetary policy using a simple Taylor-type rule as
well as of generalising the current model to a three-country model which, will
allow us to investigate the mentioned implications, but with the additional pricing
paradigm of local currency pricing.
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POL ICY SP I L LOVER EFFECTS
3.1 introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2007/08, there has been a revival of the literature on
fiscal policy. As policy rates in many developed economies approach the zero lower
bound, policymakers have increasingly seen the need to employ a monetary and
fiscal policy mix in order to stimulate the economy. This generates an important set
of questions. What is the effect of shocks to government spending and taxation on
the economy? What are the differences between the impact of changing taxes and
changing government spending? Is there any cross-border effect of these domestic
fiscal policies? And is there any heterogeneity in the impact across countries?
Besides these questions being important on the theoretical level, they are also of
relevance for policymakers who are either concerned with designing optimal fiscal
interventions or who seek to shield their economies from any negative spillovers
that may arise from other countries’ fiscal policies. This paper contributes to
the recent and growing literature on employing structural vector autoregressions
(henceforth SVAR) to analyse the impact of fiscal policy shocks (see, for example,
Ramey (2019) and Castelnuovo and Lim (2019) for good surveys).
Using SVARs with external instruments and data on macroeconomics variables
from the UK and Canada, we find the following main results: shocks to the US
fiscal policy (i.e. changes in government spending and tax revenue) causes the trade
balance in the UK to increase, while it causes the Canadian dollar to appreciate
versus the US dollar, although the magnitude of the impact is larger in shocks to
government spending relative to that from tax revenue policies. More specifically,
in the case of US government spending shocks, the responses of the macroeconomic
variables in both countries vary according to which instrument variables are used to
identify the shocks. However, regardless of the instrument used, local currencies in
both countries (i.e. the British pound and the Canadian dollar) appreciate against
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the US dollar; while in the case of tax revenue shocks, the trade balance in both
countries increase. These results are in line with those reported in some of the
related empirical VAR literature (Nicar 2015, for instance). Further details are
provided in the literature review section.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 will briefly discuss the
related literature. Section 3.3 describes the methodology of choice, including a
description of the variables and identification method used. Section 3.4 presents
and discusses the results. Finally, a concluding section 3.5 summarises the paper’s
key findings.
3.2 literature review
The literature on the effect of fiscal policy can be divided into two main strands.
The first strand focuses on the impact of fiscal policy on domestic variables, while
the second studies the international transmission of fiscal policy shocks.
In the first category, the main questions are about the effect (or effectiveness) of
fiscal policy on domestic macroeconomic variables and the magnitude of the fiscal
multipliers. On this front, one of the main papers is that of Romer and Romer
(2010). In this paper, a new narrative measure of tax changes is constructed and
used to analyse their effects on aggregate output. They identify legislated tax
changes in the US post-war period by using various narrative records and labeling
them as endogenous or exogenous according to the motivations for the changes.
The paper considers a tax change to be exogenous if it is deemed to be aimed
at either dealing with an inherited budget deficit or to stimulate long-run growth
and hence can be used when investigating the impact that tax change has on the
output. Their analysis employs a variety of methods, including simple regressions
with and without control variables and VARs with different specifications. Across
all specifications, positive exogenous tax changes lower GDP significantly. For
example, when using a bivariate quarterly VAR with log real GDP regressed on
exogenous tax changes for the sample period 1950Q1 to 2007Q4, the maximum
effect of a positive tax shock on output is estimated at 2.93 percent decline after
ten quarters, which is a large and significant response.
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While in standard VAR analysis positive government spending shocks tend to
lead to both higher hours worked and higher labour productivity (see, for example,
Blanchard and Perotti 2002), when spending shocks are identified using the nar-
rative approach, the response of hours worked is positive, whereas that of labour
productivity is negative. Ramey (2011) shows that the timing of the news is a
key factor in explaining these contradictory results. By using a simple dummy
variable – namely military date variable – she shows that the government spend-
ing shocks, which is identified through the narrative source, performs better than
the shocks which are identified through the standard VAR identification scheme,
in terms of capturing the timing of changes in future government spending. In
addition, she constructs two measures, which are based on news sources and the
Survey of Professional Forecasts (henceforth SPF), respectively, for government
spending shocks.
Mertens and Ravn (2013) exploit variation in unanticipated changes in personal
and corporate income taxes obtained via narrative accounts. These narrative ac-
counts are based on the change in total tax liabilities in Romer and Romer (2009)
and Romer and Romer (2010), with the difference that Mertens and Ravn (2013)
use distinguished components instead of total change. Based on their 7-variable
VAR, they show that changes in personal income and corporate income lead to
different responses for macro variables. For example, in terms of fiscal multipliers,
personal income’s maximum multiplier value is 2.5, whereas the corporate income
tax multiplier is not well defined as they find that changes in corporate income
taxes do not have a significant effect on tax revenues.
More recently, Forni and Gambetti (2016) use survey data from the SPF to
distinguish government spending news shocks from standard government spend-
ing shocks. In the news shocks related literature, especially regarding technology
shocks, news shocks are considered to present the timing of the shocks without
delay. Forni and Gambetti (2016) take this point and show that news shocks are
closely related to the most important historical events in government spending
episodes, while surprise shocks are not. They identify the news shocks from an
8-variable US quarterly Bayesian VAR, which posits the cumulative median fore-
casts over the subsequent four quarters regarding the growth rates of government
spending as being ordered second after the standard government spending variable.
In this specification, the residuals corresponding to the government spending vari-
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able are used as surprise shocks. If the two shocks are thought to be different, the
paper shows that the real exchange rate puzzle, which refers to the depreciation
of the real exchange rate with a fiscal expansion, does not exist anymore for the
news shocks.
The second strand focuses on the fiscal policy cross-border spillovers. This
strand experienced a revival after the financial crisis in 2007/08, motivated by
more governments’ increasing use of fiscal policy as a stabilizing policy since then.
As Nicar (2015) argues, the impact of domestic fiscal policy on other countries is
not well documented in the literature.
Fisher and Peters (2010) identify government spending shocks by using the ac-
cumulated excess return of large military contractors. In an SVAR framework,
this variable is ordered last among other macro variables, and therefore surprises
in this new measure are considered exogenous government spending shocks. The
positive government spending shocks lead to higher output and hours, but lower
real wages in the short-term. In terms of focusing on military expenditures of the
federal government, the approach could be considered to have some similarities
to the approach in Ramey (2011), however, it turns out that, indeed the two se-
ries from each approach show quite distinct movements. Further, the explanatory
power of the identified shock is quite low with very low F−statistics and Ramey
(2016) concludes that the excess return variable might not be a good measure for
government spending.
Enders et al. (2011) jointly identify government spending and technology shocks
by imposing sign restrictions and estimate the response of the real exchange rate
to the latter. They generate formal sign restrictions based on the two (symmetric)
country business cycle model. Once the shocks are jointly identified, they employ
an SVAR for the US data. Except for the real exchange rate and the terms of
trade, all the other variables in an SVAR are relative terms to an aggregate of
other industrialised countries – Euro Area, Japan, Canada, and the UK. They
show that a positive technology shock generates a real exchange rate appreciation,
while a positive (possibly anticipated) government spending shock generates a
depreciation.
Leeper et al. (2012) consider anticipated fiscal news shocks, where two types
of fiscal foresight (US government spending and tax changes) are identified via
a structural VAR model and then mapped into a DSGE model. To be specific,
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spending news shocks are identified using the SPF data, and tax news shocks using
the implicit tax rates, which is constructed by the information from the municipal
bond market.
Nicar (2015) investigates the international fiscal policy spillover from govern-
ment spending and tax shocks in the US. Using vector autoregressive with sign
restrictions method, the paper studies the impact of shocks to these two types of
fiscal policies macroeconomic variables in the UK, Canada, and Japan for the pe-
riod between 1975 and 2014 (for Japan, starting from 1979). The paper found that
spillovers from unexpected fiscal stimulus are not the same across the countries,
albeit all countries experienced an increase in GDP. In terms of the two shocks,
they found that shocks to government spending produce a larger impact on the
three countries compared to the impact of shocks to the tax rates.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2015) study the effects of fiscal shocks on domes-
tic currency using high-frequency data. They found, in contrast to most of the
empirical literature, that shocks to fiscal policy are associated with an apprecia-
tion of domestic currency. This result is more in line with the predictions of the
theoretical models.
Faccini et al. (2015) study the impact of US fiscal policy on its key trading
partners by building a two-country model featuring nominal rigidities, counter-
cyclical mark-ups, rule of thumb consumers and government spending reversals.
They find that the impact of shocks to the US government expenditure is large
and significant. One of the main channels for this is by causing the interest rate
to decrease, while no evidence that trade balance increase plays any significant
role. Furthermore, the paper did not find any results in support of the role of the
state dependence in influencing the propagation of the international spillover from
shocks to the fiscal policy.
Popescu and Shibata (2017) investigate the US fiscal spillover effects on the real
effective exchange rate and trade balance by employing a quarterly panel VAR
consisting of 30 US trading partner countries for the period 1981Q1 to 2016Q4.
They identify the anticipated fiscal shocks following Forni and Gambetti (2016).
Based on the quarterly SPF reported by the Philadelphia Fed, the fiscal news
variable is defined as the cumulative expectations for four subsequent quarters
ahead regarding government spending growth rates. The fiscal news shock is then
identified via a VAR using the US data only by the Cholesky identification scheme.
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These two VARs lead to a conclusion that anticipated government spending shocks
bring about the appreciation of the US dollar (in real and effective terms) and the
worsening of trade balance in a panel of 30 US trading partners.
Developing an alternative identification procedure for the anticipated defence
shocks, Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017) identification strategy imposes ’medium-run’
constraints on a structural VAR uses the tax changes variable of Romer and Romer
(2010) and a total factor productivity (TFP) measure of Fernald (2014) among
defence spending, output, and other macroeconomic variables. The defence news
shocks are identified as the shocks which are contemporaneously orthogonal to the
defence spending and that best explain the future variation in defence spending
over a five-year horizon.
Recently, Metelli and Natoli (2019) investigate the international spillover effects
of US fiscal shocks using a Global VAR model. The other major model feature is
the use of proxy when identifying fiscal shocks – both tax cuts and an increase in
government expenditure – in the US model. Based on these features, they present
the spillover effects quantitatively in the form of fiscal multipliers and show that
tax cut has a stronger effect than expansionary spending in terms of domestic
effects. In addition, they argue that the main transmission is via international
trade, while the financial channel also acts for the transmission mechanism.
Table 3.1 summarizes the main papers in this literature and the methods they
used:
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Paper Method
Fisher and Peters (2010) Accumulated excess return of large military contractors
Romer and Romer (2010) Narrative measure of tax
Enders, Müller, and Scholl (2011) Sign restrictions
Ramey (2011) Narrative method
Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012) SVAR and DSGE models
Mertens and Ravn (2013) Narrative accounts
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2015) High frequency data
Nicar (2015) Sign restrictions
Faccini et al. (2016) Two-country model
Forni and Gambetti (2016) IV Bayesian VAR
Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017) “medium-run” constraints SVAR
Popescu and Shibata (2017) IV VAR
Metelli and Natoli (2019) IV GVAR
Table 3.1: List of literature’s main papers
3.3 methodology
3.3.1 SVAR-IV
One of the limitations of conventional VARs is that these models are commonly
overparameterized and this issue is particularly acute in 2-country VAR models,
which require simultaneously modelling the foreign and home blocks. Similarly, to
chapter 1, to circumvent this, we employ an external instrument approach (Stock
and Watson 2012; Mertens and Ravn 2013), which involves using external infor-
mation that is relevant (i.e. correlated with the shocks of interest) and exogenous
(uncorrelated with other shocks). These external instruments create a proxy for the
shocks. These ‘proxy’ SVAR take a different route from standard SVAR identifica-
tion methods which usually place timing (short run or long run) or sign restrictions
on the VAR structure. (See the relevant section on chapter 1 or Stock and Watson
2018 for a more detailed description of the methods employed)
The above method is valid when the external instrument used is strong (i.e.
highly correlated with the shock of interest) and the impulse response functions
can be formed the standard way. However, when instruments are shown to be weak
then the inferences obtained from these estimations are unreliable. Weak instru-
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ments present a challenge to the construction of impulse response confidence sets.
Montiel-Olea et al. (2018) show, via Monte Carlo simulations, that a supposedly
95% confidence interval can cover as little as 85%. The authors then suggest a con-
fidence set for impulse response coefficients that is not affected by the instrument
strength (i.e. the degree of correlation between the shock and the instrument) and
it is asymptotically equivalent with the standard confidence set when the instru-
ment is strong. In fact, these authors allow for a correlation to approach zero as
the sample size increases. The resulting weak-instrument robust confidence sets
follow the methods used in Fieller (1944) and Anderson and Rubin (1949). A use-
ful and brief review of Anderson-Rubin confidence set and Fieller’s problem are
supplied in that paper. We use these weak-instrument robust external-instrument
methods to estimate our impulse response confidence sets. Interested readers in
the method might benefit from section 6 of Montiel-Olea et al. (2018) where Kilian
(2009) 3-variable SVAR model and data are used to illustrate these methods.
3.3.2 Baseline model specification
We estimate a 7-variable SVAR-IV with one lag as our baseline model for US
government spending and tax revenue cases, respectively. We choose one lag for
our baseline model to mainly avoid the possible curse of dimensionality since we
have seven variables in the system, but the sample period is relatively short (the
shortest case: 1985Q1-2005Q4, 84 observations).
Thus, our baseline model vector for government spending spillover is as follows:
yt = [∆log(GUSt ),∆log(GDPt), pit,TBt,Xratet,Spreadt,∆log(stpricet)] (3.1)
where GUSt refers to the US government spending, and all other variables refer to
macroeconomic data series of small open economies (SOE, henceforth) of interest,
i.e. the UK or Canada. GDPt is real GDP, pit stands for CPI inflation rate, TBt
is the ratio of bilateral net export of goods to GDP, Xratet is real exchange rate,
Spreadt is differential in long- and short-term interest rates in the US and the SOE
of interest, stpricet is a stock price index. We take first-differences of the natural
logarithms of US variables (both GUSt and TUSt ), as well as GDP and stock price
index for the SOE, to make the system stationary.
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The baseline model vector for tax revenue spillover is similarly defined, but now
we use US tax revenue instead of US government spending. Thus, the model vector
is as below:
yt = [∆log(TUSt ),∆log(GDPt), pit,TBt,Xratet,Spreadt,∆log(stpricet)] (3.2)
where TUSt refers to the US tax revenue, and other variables for the SOE remain
the same as the baseline model for the government spending spillover case. The
detailed data description can be found in the Table 3.2.
To identify the unexpected US government spending shocks, four different se-
ries of external instruments – the military news variable from Ramey and Zubairy
(2018) (RZ, henceforth), the news variable constructed following Forni and Gam-
betti (2016) (FG, henceforth), the excess returns of defense contractors from Fisher
and Peters (2010) (FP, henceforth), and the defense news variable from Ben Zeev
and Pappa (2017) (BP, henceforth) – are used, and two – all exogenous tax changes
from Romer and Romer (2010) (RR, henceforth), and the 1-5-year ahead tax ex-
pectation from Leeper et al. (2012) (LRW, henceforth) – are used to identify US
tax shocks.1 Table 3.3 summarises the external IVs with their available sample
period, however, for the analysis we consider the common sample period only for
both the external IVs and the model variables are available, which is summarised
in Table 3.4.
3.4 empirical results
We now present point estimates of impulse responses by different external instru-
ments (one at a time) and all-IV, for the US government spending shocks and
the US tax shocks, respectively, on macroeconomic variables in both the UK and
1 Following Forni and Gambetti (2016), the news variable is constructed by using the Survey
of Professional Forecasters from the Philadelphia Fed. In particular, it is defined as time t’s
forecasts of government spending growth on the following quarters minus the forecasts for the
same quarters made at time t− 1. The excess returns of defense contractors from Fisher and
Peters (2010), the defense news variable from Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017), and the 1-5-year
ahead tax expectation from Leeper et al. (2012) are taken from Valerie A. Ramey’s website:
https://econweb.ucsd.edu/ vramey/research.html.
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Table 3.2: Detailed data description for a baseline specification
Countries Data description Data sources Period
US
GUS : real Government Consumption Expenditures and
Gross Investment (Bn. U$, QQ, SA)
FRED
(GCE)
1947Q1-2018Q4
TUS : real Government current tax receipts (Bn. U$, QQ, SA)
FRED
(W054RC1Q027SBEA)
1947Q1-2018Q3
US spread: averaged 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity
Rate (MM) minus averaged 3-Month Treasury
Bill: Secondary Market Rate (MM)
FRED
(GS10, TB3MS)
19
UK
GDP : real Gross Domestic Product for the UK
(Mn. £, QQ, SA)
FRED
(UKNGDP)
1960Q1-2018Q4
pi: 100 times first-difference of log of Consumer Price
Index of All Items in the UK (2015=100, QQ)
FRED
(GBRCPIALLQINMEI)
1960Q2-2018Q4
TB: 100 times real bilateral net export of goods
divided by real GDP, where net export is defined as
UK exports to US (averaged US Imports of Goods
by Customs Basis from the UK, (Mn. U$, MM))
minus UK imports from US (averaged US Exports
of Goods by FAS Basis to the UK (Mn. U$, MM))
FRED
(IMPUK, EXPUK)
1985Q1-2018Q4
Xrate: averaged real U$/£Foreign Exchange Rate (MM)
(nominal exchange rate is transformed to real term
by multiplying UK GDP deflator/US GDP deflator)
FRED
(EXUSUK)
1971Q1-2018Q4
Spread: UK spread minus US spread.
UK spread: 10-year Long-Term Government Bond
Yields (QQ) minus 3-Month or 90-day Rates and
Yields: Treasury Securities (QQ)
FRED
(IRLTLT01GBQ156N,
IR3TTS01GBQ156N)
1960Q1-2017Q2
stprice:real FTSE 100
Datastream
(FTSE100)
1984Q1-2018Q4
Canada
GDP : real Gross Domestic Product for Canada
(Mn. C$, QQ, SA)
FRED
(CANGDPNQDSMEI)
1961Q1-2018Q4
pi: 100 times first-difference of log of Consumer Price
Index of All Items in Canada (2015=100, QQ)
FRED
(CANCPIALLQINMEI)
1960Q2-2018Q4
TB: 100 times real bilateral net export of goods
divided by real GDP, where net export is defined as
Canada exports to US (averaged US Imports of Goods
by Customs Basis from Canada (Mn. U$, MM))
minus Canada imports from US (averaged US Exports
of Goods by FAS Basis to Canada (Mn. U$, MM))
FRED
(IMPCA, EXPCA)
1985Q1-2018Q4
Xrate: real C$/U$ Foreign Exchange Rate (QQ)
(nominal exchange rate is transformed to real term
by multiplying Canada GDP deflator/US GDP deflator)
FRED
(EXCAUS)
1971Q1-2018Q4
Spread: Canada spread minus US spread.
Canada spread: 10-year Long-Term Government
Bond Yields: Main (Including Benchmark) for Canada (QQ)
minus averaged Treasury bill auction-average yields-3 month (MM)
FRED
(IRLTLT01CAQ156N)
Bank of Canada
1960Q1-2018Q4
stprice: real S&P/TSX COMPOSITE index - price index Datastream
(TTOCOMP)
1985Q1-2018Q4
Notes: All nominal terms are changed to real terms by using GDP deflator (QQ) of that
country, except the real exchange rate, which uses GDP deflators of that country and
the US.
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Table 3.3: External instruments for the two types of the US fiscal shocks
Type of fiscal shocks External IVs Period
Spending shocks
RZ: the military news variable from
Ramey and Zubairy (2018)
1890-2015Q4
FG: the news variable from
Forni and Gambetti (2016)
1981Q4-2018Q4
FP: the excess returns of defense contractors
from Fisher and Peters (2010)
1947-2008Q4
BP: the defense news variable from
Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017)
1948Q1-2007Q4
Tax shocks
RR: all exogenous tax changes from
Romer and Romer (2010)
1945-2007Q4
LRW: the 1-5-year ahead tax expectation
from Leeper et al. (2012)
1954Q1-2005Q4
Canada, separately. Please note that since we use the same ’scale normalisation’
as in Stock and Watson (2018) and Montiel-Olea et al. (2018), the fiscal shock of
interest is fixed such that it leads to a unit increase in the US variable. Thus, an
identified US government spending shock is normalised so that it makes 1 percent-
age point increase in the percentage change of the US government spending, i.e.
∆log(GUSt ). Figure A.40 presents the non-cumulative IRFs of the UK variables
to one unit of the US government spending shock. It clearly shows how the UK’s
key macroeconomic variables respond differently to a US government spending
shock according to which external instrument is used to identify the shock, with
one exception – TB-to-GDP ratio. UK’s trade balance, as the form of ratio to
GDP, increases on impact in response to a positive US government spending shock
in all five (one IV at one time, and all IVs at once) cases. Similarly, UK’s real
exchange rate increases on impact in four cases (i.e. except FG case) with the
maximum magnitude of 5.73 percent points. An increase in exchange rate implies
the appreciation of Sterling Pound, since our nominal exchange rate is U$ to one
£. Regarding the possible weak-IV diagnostics, as we can see from Table 3.4, in
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all five cases, the Wald statistics ξ are above the threshold of 2.7055, implying that
the instrument(s) are reasonably strong.2
When we see Figure A.42, most of Canada variables also respond heteroge-
neously to a positive US government spending shock according to which IV is used
to identify the shock, with only one exception – exchange rate. Canada’s real
exchange rate decreases on impact and here a decrease in exchange rate implies
the appreciation of Canadian dollar, since our nominal exchange rate for Canada
is Canadian dollar to one US dollar. As the weak-IV diagnostics, Table 3.4 shows
that in all five cases for Canada, the same as the UK, the Wald statistics are above
threshold of 2.7055.
2 We are reporting the Wald statistics as in Montiel-Olea et al. (2018) which is a more refined
method in comparison with the more conservative Stock and Yogo (2005) ’rule-of-the-thumb’
threshold that requires the value to be above 10 - with weak-IV robust confidence set, the results
are valid regardless.
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Table 3.4: Wald-statistics by the different use of external IVs
Type of fiscal shocks IVs
UK Canada
Wald Sample Period Wald Sample Period
For the US government
spending shocks
RZ 7.1831 1985Q1-2015Q4 3.1751 1985Q1-2015Q4
FG 3.2273 1985Q1-2017Q2 5.7294 1985Q1-2018Q4
FP 5.4574 1985Q1-2008Q4 8.5200 1985Q1-2008Q4
BP 3.8483 1985Q1-2007Q4 4.8964 1985Q1-2007Q4
All 3.8622 1985Q1-2007Q4 4.4879 1985Q1-2007Q4
For the US tax revenue
shocks
RR 3.3716 1985Q1-2007Q4 4.7979 1985Q1-2007Q4
LRW 4.5644 1985Q1-2005Q4 1.3110 1985Q1-2005Q4
All 2.9868 1985Q1-2005Q4 0.7977 1985Q1-2005Q4
Notes: Given the confidence level (90%), if the Wald-statistic is larger than 2.7055, the
weak-IV robust confidence set will be bounded interval for every horizon.
Figure A.44 and Figure A.46 show the non-cumulative IRFs of UK and Canada
variables to a decrease in the US tax revenue. For a more straightforward com-
parison with the government spending spillovers, we use a negative US tax shock.
When we see Figure A.44 first, similar to a positive shock to the government spend-
ing, the UK variables reacted heterogeneously with an exception of TB-to-GDP
ratio which increased on impact for all three (two instruments at a time, and both
IVs at the same time) cases. Thus, we might conclude that a expansionary US fis-
cal shock (in both government spending and tax revenue cases ) lead to a increase
in UK’s trade balance, as the form of ratio to GDP. Figure A.46 present similar, i.e.
heterogeneous, responses of Canada variables to a negative US tax shock. How-
ever, the exchange rate decreases on impact, same as in the fiscal spending shocks,
suggesting the appreciation of Canadian dollars. In addition, Canada’s TB-to-
GDP ratio increase on impact in all three cases, and these positive responses can
be found also in the UK’s TB-to-GDP ratios to both a positive US government
spending shock and a negative US tax shock. In terms of Wald statistics, here as
well all the instruments in both countries’ models (with the exception of two cases
in Canada’s model) are above the threshold of 2.7055, as Table 3.4 suggests.
We now investigate the comparison between the two countries, and for an eas-
ier comparison, we consider the all-IVs case only. As we can see from Figure
A.48, while some variables (e.g., CPI inflation rate, exchange rate, and stock price
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growth) respond similarly in both countries, others respond differently to a positive
US government spending shock. Among those similarly responding variables, we
have exchange rate, i.e. both currencies in the UK and Canada show appreciation
to the shock. Stock price index growth also respond positively on impact in both
countries.
With a negative US tax shock, however, in most variables we can see the similar
responses in both countries. Figure A.50 presents the homogeneous IRFs for both
countries, with two exceptions (CPI inflation rate and exchange rate). In the case
of CPI inflation rate, it decreases on impact in the UK, which is the opposite
case from Figure A.48, while it shows a positive response on impact in Canada.
Regarding exchange rate, UK’s exchange rate now implies the depreciation of £,
which is the opposite case from Figure A.50. On the contrary, Canadian dollars
appreciate to a negative US tax shock, which is the same response to a positive US
government spending shock. Stock price index growth react positively on impact
in both countries, which are also found in the case of a positive US government
spending shock. In addition, TB-to-GDP ratios also increase on impact in both
countries.
3.5 conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the cross-border effect of shocks to the US fiscal
policy on other countries. In particular the impact of these shocks on key macroe-
conomic variables in the UK and Canada. This topic has been more discussed in
recent decades and especially since the global financial crisis. This has been driven,
at least in part, by the need of many advanced countries to intensify their use of
fiscal policy in face of zero lower bound constraints that limit the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
The results show that the effect of spillover from the US fiscal policy is not
uniform across the two countries, the two types of shocks (i.e. changes to govern-
ment spending and tax revenue), and the set of identifying instruments. However,
generally speaking, shocks to the US fiscal policy (i.e. government spending and
tax revenue) causes the trade balance in the UK to increase while it causes the
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Canadian dollar to appreciate versus the US dollar. In addition, the magnitude
of the impact is larger in shocks to the government spending compared to the tax
revenue policies.
More specifically, in case of shocks to the US government spending, the reaction
of the macroeconomic variables in both countries vary according to which instru-
ment variables are used to identify the shocks. However, one thing in common is
that local currency in both countries (i.e. the British pound and the Canadian dol-
lar) appreciate versus the US dollar. While in the case of shocks to the tax revenue
policy, the trade balance in both countries increases. Though the heterogeneity in
terms of reacting to the shocks among the key variables in both countries remains
as in the case of shocks the government spending in the sense they varies according
to the instruments that are used.
The results observed in this chapter can be explained through two different
transmission channels. The UK results show a fiscal spillover through the trade
channel. Following this channel, an expansionary fiscal policy should increase
consumption demand (in the US) and this will lead to a positive impact on the
UK’s output and hence improve its trade balance. The magnitude of the effect will
depend on the degree of openness. In the case of Canada, the results may come by
through the exchange rate channel. Though there is less agreement in the literature
on the way that exchange rate reacts to changes in fiscal policy, studies such as
Kim and Roubini (2008) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010) show that currency of
source country (the US) do depreciate in response to an expansionary fiscal policy.
Therefore, Canada’s results represent the same conclusion.
Our future research will aim to extend this study from the just-identified case to
the over-identified by developing procedures that implement the method suggested
by Montiel-Olea et al. (2018).
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a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.1: Baseline model, US-Canada: FF4 as proxy (F-statistic: 18.61)
Figure A.2: Baseline model, US-Canada: GSS instrument set as proxies (F-statistic:
23.22)
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a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.3: Baseline model, US-Canada: Full instrument set as proxies (F-statistic:
13.33)
Figure A.4: Baseline model, US-Mexico: FF4 as proxy (F-statistic: 46.73)
Figure A.5: Baseline model, US-Mexico: GSS instrument set as proxies
89
a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.6: Baseline model, US-Mexico: Full instrument set as proxies
Figure A.7: Extended model, US-Canada: Mortgage spread, Full instrument set
Figure A.8: Extended model, US-Canada: Credit spread, Full instrument set
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a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.9: Extended model, US-Canada: Stock prices, Full instrument set
Figure A.10: Extended model, US-Canada: VIX, Full instrument set
Figure A.11: Extended model, US-Mexico: Credit spread, Full instrument set
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a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.12: Extended model, US-Mexico: Stock prices, Full instrument set
Figure A.13: Extended model, US-Mexico: VIX, Full instrument set
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a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.14: LP-IV, US-Canada
Figure A.15: LP-IV, US-Mexico
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a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.16: Estimated causal effect of MP shocks on selected economic variables
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a.1 chapter 1: figures
Figure A.17: Estimated causal effect of MP shocks on selected economic variables
Figure A.18: Tests for VAR Invertibility
Figure A.19: Tests for VAR Invertibility
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a.2 chapter 1: tables
a.2 chapter 1: tables
Variable Source
US interest rate Effective Federal Funds Rate
FRED database
US output Industrial Production Index (INDPRO)
FRED database
US inflation (CPI) Consumer Price Index: All Items Less Food and Energy (CPILFESL)
FRED database
Canada interest rate (policy interest rates) Bank Rate- Selected Historical Interest Rates
Bank of Canada
Canada output Industrial Production Index
OECD data
Canada inflation (CPI) Consumer Price Index: All Items Excluding Food and Energy for Canada (CANCPICORMINMEI)
FRED
US/CAN exchange rate (nominal exchange rate) Currency exchange rates, National units per US-Dollar (monthly average)
OECD data
Canada Mortgage Spread MS=Chartered bank administered interest rates (conventional mortgage (5 year))
- selected gov benchmark bond yields (5 year)
Bank of Canada
Canada Credit Spread CS=Prime corporate paper rate (3 month) - Treasury bill auction - average yields (3 month)
Bank of Canada
Canada Stock market Total Share Prices for All Shares for Canada
FRED
VIX Index CBOE Volatility Index
FRED
Mexico interest rate Short-term interest rates
OECD data
Mexico output Industrial Production Index
OECD data
Mexico inflation Inflation (CPI) (indicator), total less food, less energy
OECD data
US/MEX exchange rate (nominal exchange rate) Currency exchange rates, National units per US-Dollar (monthly average)
OECD data
Mexico Credit Spread CS= 3-Month Interbank Rates - 3-Month Treasury Securities
FRED
Mexico Stock market Total Share Prices for All Shares for Mexico
FRED
VIX Index CBOE Volatility Index: VIX, Index
FRED
Table A.1: Data sources
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a.3 chapter 2:impulse response to a domestic (upper) and
foreign (lower) monetary policy shock
a.3 chapter 2:impulse response to a do-
mestic (upper) and foreign (lower)
monetary policy shock
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a.3 chapter 2:impulse response to a domestic (upper) and
foreign (lower) monetary policy shock
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Figure A.20: Impulse Response to a Domestic (upper) and foreign (Lower) Monetary
policy shocks- Mexico Case
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a.3 chapter 2:impulse response to a domestic (upper) and
foreign (lower) monetary policy shock
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Figure A.21: Impulse Response to a Domestic (upper) and foreign (Lower) Monetary
policy shock- Canada Case
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a.3 chapter 2:impulse response to a domestic (upper) and
foreign (lower) monetary policy shock
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Figure A.22: Impulse Response to a Domestic (upper) and foreign (Lower) Monetary
policy shock- PCP Comparison
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Figure A.23: Impulse Response to a Domestic (upper) and foreign (Lower) Monetary
policy shock- DCP Comparison
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a.4 chapter 2:summary of dynamic two-
bloc model. producer currency
pricing case
Home country bloc
Production, capital law of motion, capital and labour demand
YWt = (AtHt)
αK1−αt−1 (D.1)
Yt =
YWt
∆t
(D.2)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1−S(Xt))It (D.3)
rKt = (1− α)
YWt
Kt−1
MCt
PH,t
Pt
(D.4)
Wt = α
YWt
Ht
MCt
PH,t
Pt
(D.5)
RKt =
rKt (1− τk) + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
(D.6)
Price Setting
1 = ξ (ΠH,t−1,t)ζ−1 + (1− ξ)
(
JJt
Jt
)1−ζ
(D.7)
∆t = ξ (ΠH,t−1,t)
ζ ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
JJt
Jt
)−ζ
(D.8)
JJt =
ζ
ζ − 1
PH,t
Pt
YtMStMCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)
ζ
JJt+1
]
(D.9)
Jt =
PH,t
Pt
Yt + ξEt
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)ζΠt,t+1 Jt+1
 (D.10)
Et
[
Λt,t+1RKt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
]
Rt = 1 (D.11)
Qt(1−S(Xt)−XtS ′(Xt)) +Et
[
Λt,t+1Qt+1S ′(Xt+1)I
2
t+1
I2t
]
=
P It
Pt
(D.12)
S(Xt) ≡ φX(Xt −X)2 (D.13)
S ′(Xt+1) ≡ 2 ∗ φX(Xt −X) (D.14)
Household labour supply, Euler equation
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URC,t = (1− %)
(
CRt − χCRt−1
)(1−%)(1−σ)−1 (
1−HRt
)%(1−σ)
(D.15)
Λt,t+1 ≡ β
URC,t+1
URC,t
(D.16)
%
1− %
CCt − χCCt−1
1−HCt
= Wt (1− τwt ) (D.17)
%
1− %
CRt − χCRt−1
1−HRt
= Wt (1− τwt ) (D.18)
Ht = λH
C
t + (1− λ)HRt (D.19)
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
]
Rt (D.20)
Household consumption and investment
CRt =
1
1− λCt −
λ
1− λC
C
t (D.21)
CCt = WtH
C
t (D.22)
Ct =
CH,t
wC
(
PH,t
Pt
)−µC (D.23)
CF ,t = (1−wC)
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC
Ct (D.24)
CH,t = Yt − IH,t −EXt −Gt (D.25)
IH,t = wI
(
PH,t
P It
)−µI
It (D.26)
IF ,t = (1−wI)
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI
It (D.27)
Interest rate
log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+ (1− ρr)
(
θpi log
(
Πt−1,t
Π
)
+ θs log
(
ΠS,t−1,t
ΠS
)
+θy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ θdy log
(
Yt
Yt−1
))
+ M ,t (D.28)
UIP, net foreign assets evolution, terms of trade, price ratios, trade balance
Tt
Tt−1 =
ΠF ,t−1,t
ΠH,t−1,t
(D.29)
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Pt
PH,t
=
(
wC + (1−wC)T 1−µCt
) 1
1−µC (D.30)
Pt
PF ,t
=
(
wCT µC−1t + (1−wC)
) 1
1−µC (D.31)
P It
PH,t
=
(
wI + (1−wI)T 1−µIt
) 1
1−µI (D.32)
P It
PF ,t
=
(
wIT µI−1t + (1−wI)
) 1
1−µI (D.33)
P It
Pt
=
PHt
Pt
PHt
P It
(D.34)
Πt−1,t =
wC
(
ΠH,t−1,t
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)1−µC
+ (1−wC)
(
ΠF ,t−1,t
PF ,t−1
Pt−1
)1−µC
1
1−µC
(D.35)
TBt = P
∗O
t RERt Y
O +
PH,t
Pt
Yt −Ct − P
I
t
Pt
It − PH,t
Pt
Gt (D.36)
τwt =
PH,t
Pt
Gt − rKt τkkt−1 − P ∗Ot RERt Y O τO
WtHt
(D.37)
General Case EXt = nC∗H,t + nI∗H,t
Differences
ΠFt,t+1 = Π
F ∗
t,t+1Π
S
t,t+1 (D.38)
ΠHt,t+1 = Π
H∗
t,t+1Π
S
t,t+1 (D.39)
φ(x) = exp(−φB
B∗F ,t
PH,t
Pt
Yt
) (D.40)
1 = R∗tφ
StB∗F ,t
PH,t
Pt
Yt
Et
[
Λt,t+1
Πt,t+1
ΠSt,t+1
]
(D.41)
PBt
∗
BF ,t =
ΠSt−1,t
Πt−1,t
BF ,t−1 + TBt (D.42)
PBt
∗
=
1
Rt
∗φ
 StB∗F ,t
PH,t
Pt
Yt
 (D.43)
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RERt =
(
w∗C + (1−w∗C)(T ∗t )1−µ
∗
C
) 1
1−µ∗
C(
wCT µC−1t + (1−wC)
) 1
1−µC
=
PF ,t
Pt
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
(D.44)
Shock processes
logAt − logA = ρA(logAt−1 − logA) + A,t (D.45)
logGt − logG = ρG(logGt−1 − logG) + G,t (D.46)
logMSt − logMS = ρMS(logMSt−1 − logMS) + MS,t (D.47)
log ISt − log IS = ρIS(log ISt−1 − log IS) + IS,t (D.48)
log tott − log tot = ρtot(log tott−1 − log tot) + tot,t (D.49)
logP ∗Ot − logP ∗O = ρP ∗O(logP ∗Ot−1 − logP ∗O) + P ∗O,t (D.50)
Foreign country bloc
Production, capital law of motion, capital and labour demand
Y ∗t
W = (A∗tH
∗
t )
α∗K∗t−1
1−α∗ (D.51)
Y ∗t =
Y ∗t
W
∆∗t
(D.52)
K∗t = (1− δ∗)K∗t−1 + (1−S∗(X∗t ))I∗t (D.53)
r∗t
K = (1− α∗) Y
∗W
t
K∗t−1
MC∗t
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
(D.54)
W ∗t = α
∗Y ∗t
W
H∗t
MC∗t
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
(D.55)
R∗t
K =
r∗t
K (1− τ∗k ) + (1− δ∗)Q∗t
Q∗t−1
(D.56)
Price Setting
1 = ξ∗
(
Π∗F ,t−1,t
)ζ∗−1
+ (1− ξ∗)
(
JJ∗t
J∗t
)1−ζ∗
(D.57)
∆∗t = ξ
∗ (Π∗F ,t−1,t)ζ∗ ∆∗t−1 + (1− ξ∗)
(
JJ∗t
J∗t
)−ζ∗
(D.58)
JJ∗t =
ζ∗
ζ∗ − 1
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
Y ∗t MS
∗
tMC
∗
t + ξ
∗Et
[
Λ∗t,t+1
(
Π∗F ,t,t+1
)ζ∗
JJ∗t+1
]
(D.59)
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J∗t =
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
Y ∗t + ξ
∗Et
Λ∗t,t+1
(
Π∗F ,t,t+1
)ζ∗
Π∗t,t+1
J∗t+1
 (D.60)
Et
[
Λ∗t,t+1R
∗
t+1
K
]
= Et
[
Λ∗t,t+1
Π∗t,t+1
]
R∗t = 1 (D.61)
Q∗t (1−S∗(X∗t )−X∗t S∗′(X∗t )) +Et
[
Λt,t+1Q∗t+1S ′(X∗t+1)
I∗t+1
2
I∗t
2
]
=
P ∗t
I
P ∗t
(D.62)
S∗(X∗t ) ≡ φ∗X(X∗t −X∗)2 (D.63)
S∗′(X∗t+1) ≡ 2 ∗ φ∗X(X∗t −X∗) (D.64)
Household labour supply, Euler equation
U∗C,t
R = (1− %∗)
(
C∗t
R − χ∗C∗t−1R
)(1−%∗)(1−σ∗)−1 (
1−H∗t R
)%∗(1−σ∗)
(D.65)
Λ∗t,t+1 ≡ β∗
U∗C,t+1
R
U∗C,t
R
(D.66)
1 = Et
[
Λ∗t,t+1
Π∗t,t+1
]
R∗t (D.67)
%∗
1− %∗
C∗t
C − χ∗C∗t−1C
1−H∗t C
= W ∗t (1− τ∗t w) (D.68)
%∗
1− %∗
C∗t
R − χ∗C∗t−1R
1−H∗t R
= W ∗t (1− τ∗t w) (D.69)
H∗t = λ
∗HC
∗
t + (1− λ∗)HR
∗
t (D.70)
Household consumption and investment
C∗t
R =
1
1− λ∗C
∗
t −
λ∗
1− λ∗C
∗
t
C (D.71)
C∗t
C = W ∗t H
∗
t
C (D.72)
C∗t =
C∗F ,t
w∗C
(
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C (D.73)
C∗F ,t = Y
∗
t − I∗F ,t −EX∗t −G∗t (D.74)
C∗H,t = (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C
C∗t (D.75)
I∗F ,t = (w∗I)
(
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
I
)−µ∗I
I∗t (D.76)
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I∗H,t = (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I
I∗t (D.77)
Interest rate
log
(
R∗t
R∗
)
= ρ∗r log
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)
+ (1− ρ∗r)
(
θ∗pi log
(
Π∗t−1,t
Π∗
)
+ θ∗y log
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)
+ θ∗dy log
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗t−1
))
+ ∗M ,t
(D.78)
UIP, net foreign assets evolution, terms of trade, price ratios, trade balance
T ∗t =
1
Tt (D.79)
P ∗t
P ∗F ,t
=
(
w∗C + (1−w∗C)T ∗t 1−µ
∗
C
) 1
1−µ∗
C (D.80)
P ∗t
P ∗H,t
=
(
w∗CT ∗t µ
∗
C−1 + (1−w∗C)
) 1
1−µ∗
C (D.81)
P ∗t
I
P ∗F ,t
=
(
w∗I + (1−w∗I)T ∗t 1−µ
∗
I
) 1
1−µ∗
I (D.82)
P ∗t
I
P ∗H,t
=
(
w∗IT ∗t µ
∗
I−1 + (1−w∗I)
) 1
1−µ∗
I (D.83)
P ∗t
I
P ∗t
=
P ∗t
F
P ∗t
P ∗t
F
P ∗t
I
(D.84)
Π∗t−1,t =
w∗C
(
Π∗F ,t−1,t
P ∗F ,t−1
P ∗t−1
)1−µ∗C
+ (1−w∗C)
(
Π∗H,t−1,t
P ∗H,t−1
P ∗t−1
)1−µ∗C
1
1−µ∗
C
(D.85)
τw
∗
t =
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
G∗t − k∗t−1rk
∗
t τ
k∗
W ∗t H∗t
(D.86)
TB∗t =
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
Y ∗t −C∗t −
P ∗It
P ∗t
I∗t −
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
G∗t (D.87)
General Case EX∗t = IFt/n+CFt/n
Shock processes
logA∗t − logA∗ = ρ∗A(logA∗t−1 − logA∗) + ∗A,t (D.88)
logG∗t − log(G¯∗) = ρ∗G(logG∗t−1 − log(G¯∗)) + ∗G,t (D.89)
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logMS∗t − logMS∗ = ρ∗MS(logMS∗t−1 − logMS∗) + ∗MS,t (D.90)
log IS∗t − log IS∗ = ρ∗IS(log IS∗t−1 − log IS∗) + ∗IS,t (D.91)
(D.92)
General Case excst =
PH,t
Pt
n (1−w∗C)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−µ∗C C∗t
Yt
General Case exist =
PH,t
Pt
n (1−w∗I)
(
P ∗H,t
P I
∗
t
)−µ∗I I∗t
Yt
imcst =
PF ,t
Pt
(1−wC)
(
PF ,t
Pt
)−µC Ct
Yt
(D.93)
imist =
PF ,t
Pt
(1−wI)
(
PF ,t
P It
)−µI It
Yt
(D.94)
excot =
Y O RERt P
∗O
t
Yt
(D.95)
TBt
Yt
= excot + excst + exist − imcst − imist (D.96)
Y ∗byY =
PF ,t
Pt
PH,t
Pt
Y ∗t
Yt
(D.97)
a.5 chapter 2: deterministic zero-
growth steady state-calibrated
The external steady state solves using fsolve the following for preference parameter
% and %∗ to target a steady state labour supply H = H¯ and H∗ = H¯.
%
1− %
CR (1− χ)
1−HR = W (1− τ
w)
%∗
1− %∗
CR (1− χ∗)
1−H∗R = W
∗ (1− τ∗w)
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In a non-zero-net inflation steady state we have recursively for:
Home Bloc:
A = 1 (E.1)
MS = 1 (E.2)
S(X) = 0 (E.3)
S ′(X) = 0 (E.4)
Λ = β (E.5)
H = H¯ (E.6)
HC =
1− %
1− χ% (E.7)
HR =
H − λHC
1− λ (E.8)
P
PH
= 1 (E.9)
P
PF
= 1 (E.10)
P I
PH
= 1 (E.11)
P I
PF
= 1 (E.12)
P I
P
= 1 (E.13)
Q = 1 (E.14)
ΠH = Π¯ (E.15)
ΠF = Π¯ (E.16)
Π = Π¯ (E.17)
RK =
R
Π
(E.18)
JJ
J
=
1− ξ (Π)ζ−1
1− ξ

1
1−ζ
(E.19)
MC =
JJ
J
ζ − 1
ζ
1− ξβ
(
ΠH
)ζ
1− ξβ (Π)ζ−1
(E.20)
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∆ =
(1− ξ)
(
JJ
J
)−ζ
1− ξ (ΠH)ζ
(E.21)
KYW =
MC PHP (1− α)
RKQ−(1−δ)Q
(1−τK )
(E.22)
YW = KYW
1−α
α
H (E.23)
W = α
YW
H
MC (E.24)
K = YW KYW (E.25)
Y =
YW
∆
(E.26)
I = δK (E.27)
G = gyY (E.28)
G¯ = gyY (E.29)
rK = (1− α) Y
K
MC
(
1− τk
)
(E.30)
τw =
G− (1− α)YMCτk − Y O RERP ∗O τO
WH
(E.31)
CC = HC(1− τw)W (E.32)
JJ =
ζ
ζ−1YMC
1− ξβ (ΠH)ζ
(E.33)
J =
PH
P Y
1− ξβ (Π)ζ−1
(E.34)
Foreign Bloc:
A∗ = 1 (E.35)
MS∗ = 1 (E.36)
S∗(X) = 0 (E.37)
S∗′(X) = 0 (E.38)
Λ∗ = β∗ (E.39)
H∗ = H¯∗ (E.40)
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H∗C =
1− %∗
1− χ∗%∗ (E.41)
H∗R =
H∗ − λ∗H∗C
1− λ∗ (E.42)
T ∗ = 1T ∗ (E.43)
P ∗
P ∗F
= 1 (E.44)
P ∗
P ∗H
= 1 (E.45)
P ∗I
P ∗F
= 1 (E.46)
P ∗I
P ∗H
= 1 (E.47)
P ∗I
P ∗
= 1 (E.48)
Q∗ = 1 (E.49)
RER = 1 (E.50)
Π∗H = Π¯ (E.51)
Π∗F = Π¯ (E.52)
Π∗ = Π¯ (E.53)
R∗ =
Π∗
β∗
(E.54)
R∗K =
R∗
Π∗
(E.55)
Home Bloc: (E.56)
ΠS = 1 (E.57)
φ =
R
R∗ΠS
=
Π
Π∗ΠS
β∗
β
=
β∗
β
( usingR∗ = Π
∗
β∗
) (E.58)
PB
∗
=
1
R∗φ
(E.59)
BF = −Y log(φ)
φB
≥ 0 iff β ≥ β∗ (E.60)
TB =
(
1
φR∗
− Π
S
Π
)
BF (E.61)
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C = Y O RERP ∗O + Y − I −G− TB (E.62)
CR =
1
1− λ (C − λ)C
C (E.63)
URC = (1− %)
(
CR − χCR
)(1−%)(1−σ)−1 (
1−HR
)%(1−σ)
(E.64)
Foreign Bloc: (E.65)
JJ∗
J∗
=
1− ξ∗
(
Π∗F
)ζ∗−1
1− ξ∗

1
1−ζ∗
(E.66)
MC∗ =
JJ∗
J∗
ζ∗ − 1
ζ∗
1− ξ∗β∗
(
Π∗F
)ζ∗
1− ξ∗β
(
Π∗F
)ζ∗−1 (E.67)
∆∗ =
(1− ξ∗)
(
JJ∗
J∗
)−ζ∗
1− ξ
(
Π∗F
)ζ∗ (E.68)
KY ∗W =
MC∗(1− α∗)
RK∗Q∗−(1−δ∗)Q∗
(1−τK∗ )
(E.69)
Y ∗W = KY ∗
W
1−α∗
α∗
H∗ (E.70)
W ∗ = α∗
Y ∗W
H∗
MC∗ (E.71)
K∗ = Y ∗WKY ∗
W
(E.72)
Y ∗ =
Y ∗W
∆∗
(E.73)
I∗ = δ∗K∗ (E.74)
G∗ = g∗yY
∗ (E.75)
G¯∗ = g∗yY
∗ (E.76)
r∗K = (1− α∗) Y
∗
K∗
MC∗
(
1− τ∗k
)
(E.77)
τ∗w =
G∗ − (1− α∗)Y ∗MC∗τ∗k
W ∗H∗
(E.78)
C∗C = H∗C(1− τ∗w)W ∗ (E.79)
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JJ∗ =
ζ∗
ζ∗−1Y
∗MC∗
1− ξ∗β∗
(
Π∗F
)ζ∗ (E.80)
J∗ =
P ∗F
P ∗ Y
∗
1− ξ∗β∗
(
Π∗F
)ζ∗−1 (E.81)
EX = (targexcs+ targexcs)Y (E.82)
General Case EX∗ = (targimcs+ targimis)Y /n
General Case TB∗ = EX∗ −EX/n
C∗ = Y ∗ − I∗ −G∗ − TB∗ (E.83)
C∗R =
1
1− λ∗ (C
∗ − λ∗)C∗C (E.84)
U∗C
R = (1− %∗)
(
C∗R − χ∗C∗R
)(1−%∗)(1−σ∗)−1 (
1−H∗R
)%∗(1−σ∗)
(E.85)
IF = (1−wI)I (E.86)
CF = (1−wC)C (E.87)
IH = (wI)I (E.88)
CH = (wC)C (E.89)
I∗F = w∗II∗ (E.90)
C∗F = w∗CC∗ (E.91)
I∗H = (1−w∗I)I∗ (E.92)
C∗H = (1−w∗C)C∗ (E.93)
General Case excs = n (1−w∗C)
C∗
Y
General Case exis = n (1−w∗I)
I∗
Y
imcs = (1−wC)C
Y
(E.94)
imis = (1−wI) I
Y
(E.95)
exco = Y
O RERP ∗O
Y
(E.96)
tb ≡ TB
Y
= exco+ excs+ exis− imcs− imis (E.97)
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changes for dominant currency pricing
In this calibrated version of the model, the external steady state also solves
using fsolve the following for wC wI , w∗C . w∗C , β∗, Y O and A∗ to target excs =
targexcs, exis = targexis, imcs = targimcs, imis = targimis, exco = targexco,
tb ≡ TBY = targtb and Y
∗
Y = targY
∗byY
excs = targexcs (E.98)
exis = targexis (E.99)
imcs = targimcs (E.100)
imis = targimis (E.101)
exco = targexco (E.102)
tb = targtb (E.103)
Y ∗
Y
= targY ∗byY (E.104)
Note that targets have been imposed in (E.82) and (A.5) which makes
the steady state above recursive. Note also that we introduce a new
variable CheckTB into the code verifies that CheckTB = 0.
a.6 chapter 2: summary of dynamic two-
bloc model. changes for dominant
currency pricing
Previous (PCP)
JJt (F.1)
Jt (F.2)
Yt (F.3)
T ∗t (F.4)
ΠHt,t+1 (F.5)
JJt =
ζ
ζ − 1
PH,t
Pt
YtMStMCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)
ζ
JJt+1
]
(F.6)
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Jt =
PH,t
Pt
Yt + ξEt
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)ζ−1
J t+1
 (F.7)
Yt =
YWt
∆t
(F.8)
T ∗t =
1
Tt (F.9)
ΠHt,t+1 = Π
H∗
t,t+1Π
S
t,t+1 (F.10)
New (DCP)
JJt (F.11)
Jt (F.12)
Yt (F.13)
T ∗t (F.14)
JJt =
ζ
ζ − 1
PH,t
Pt
(Yt −EXt)MStMCt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)
ζ
JJt+1
]
(F.15)
Jt =
PH,t
Pt
(Yt −EXt) + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1 (ΠH,t,t+1)
ζ−1
Jt+1
]
(F.16)
Yt =
 EXtYt
∆∗H,t
+
(
1− EXtYt
)
∆t
YWt (F.17)
TtT ∗t =
MCt
MC∗H,t
(F.18)
Added equations(DCP)
MC∗H,t (F.19)
∆∗H,t (F.20)
JJ∗H,t (F.21)
J∗H,t (F.22)
StP
∗
H,t
Pt
(F.23)
ΠHt,t+1 (F.24)
1 = ξ
(
Π∗H,t−1,t
)ζ−1
+ (1− ξ)
P ∗OH,t
PH,t
1−ζ (F.25)
∆∗H,t = ξ(Π
∗
H,t−1,t)
ζ∆∗H,t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
JJ∗H,t
J∗H,t
)−ζ
(F.26)
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JJ∗H,t − ξβEt[Π∗H,t,t+1ζJJ∗H,t+1] =
1
1− 1ζ
StP
∗
H,t
Pt
(EXt)UC,tMC
∗
H,tMSt (F.27)
J∗H,t − ξβEt[Π∗H,t,t+1ζ−1J∗H,t+1] =
StP
∗
H,t
Pt
(EXt)UC,t (F.28)
MC∗H,t =
MCt
PH,t
Pt
StP ∗H,t
Pt
(F.29)
Previous SSmodel (PCP)
JJ =
ζ
ζ−1
PH
P YMC
1− ξβ (ΠH)ζ
(F.30)
J =
PH
P Y
1− ξβ (ΠH)ζ−1
(F.31)
Y =
YW
∆
(F.32)
NOW (DCP)
”EXY is replaced by (targexcs+ targexis)”
Yt =
(
(targexcs+ targexis)
∆∗H,t
+
(1− (targexcs+ targexis))
∆t
)
YWt (F.33)
JJ =
ζ
ζ−1
PH
P (Y −EX)MC
1− ξβ (ΠH)ζ
(F.34)
J =
PH
P (Y −EX)
1− ξβ (ΠH)ζ−1
(F.35)
JJ∗H =
ζ
ζ−1
S P ∗H
P EXMC
∗
H
1− ξβ (Π∗H)ζ
(F.36)
J∗H =
S P ∗H
P EX
1− ξβ (Π∗H)ζ−1
(F.37)
MC∗H =
JJ∗H
J∗H
ζ − 1
ζ
1− ξβ (Π∗H)ζ
1− ξβ (Π∗H)ζ−1
(F.38)
∆∗H =
(1− ξ)
(
JJ∗H
J∗H
)−ζ
1− ξ (Π∗H)ζ
(F.39)
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calibrated two-bloc model for (closed row-soe case)
SP ∗H
P
=
MC PHP
MC∗H
(F.40)
a.7 chapter 2: summary of changes in
the dynamic calibrated two-bloc
model for (closed row-soe case)
We replace the following
TB∗t =
P ∗F ,t
P ∗t
EX∗t −
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
EXt
n
EX∗t =
CFt
n
+
IFt
n
EXt = nCH
∗
t + n IH
∗
t
with the following
TB∗t = 0
EX∗t = 0
EXt =
targexcs
C∗/Y
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)µ∗C
C∗t +
targexis
I∗/Y
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗I,t
)µ∗I
I∗t
a.8 chapter 2: summary of changes in
the steady state calibrated two-
bloc model (closed row-soe case)
We replace the following
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TB∗ = EX∗ − EX
n
EX∗ = (targimcs+ targimis)Y /n
with the following
TB∗=0
EX∗ = 0
a.9 chapter 2: data sources
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Variables Frequency Code Source Comment
Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in
Constant Prices: Total Gross Domestic
Product for Canada
Quarterly NAEXKP01CAQ189S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NAEXKP01CAQ189S Seasonally Adjusted
Gross
Domestic Product by Expenditure in Constant Prices:
Private Final Consumption Expenditure for Canada,
National Currency
Quarterly NAEXKP02CAQ189S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NAEXKP02CAQ189S Seasonally Adjusted
Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in
Constant Prices: Gross Fixed Capital
Formation for Canada, National Currency
Quarterly NAEXKP04CAQ189S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NAEXKP04CAQ189S Seasonally Adjusted
Policy Rate (PR) :
Percent Annual. Source: Bank of Canada.
Bank of Canada- Bank Rate-
Selected Historical Interest Rates
Policy Rate (PR) https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/
selected_historical_v122530.pdf
Not Seasonally Adjusted
Canada / U.S. Foreign
Exchange Rate, Canadian Dollars to One U.S. Dollar
Quarterly DEXCAUS https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXCAUS Not Seasonally Adjusted
Canada, Terms of Trade (Export Prices / Import Prices),
SA, 2012 = 100, (CNTOTPRCE),
Time span: Jan 1986 - Jan 2019
POILBREUSDM https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/POILBREUSDM seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
Global price of Brent Crude, U.S. Dollars per Barrell POILBREUSDM https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/POILBREUSDM seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
Consumer Price Index: Total All Items for the United States,
Index 2015=100
Quarterly CPALTT01USQ661S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPALTT01USQ661S Seasonally adjusted
Consumer
Price Index: Total All Items for the United States,
Index 2015=100
Quarterly CPALTT01USQ661S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPALTT01USQ661S Seasonally adjusted
Consumer
Price Index: Total,
All Items for Canada, Index 2015=100
Quarterly CPALCY01CAQ661N https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPALCY01CAQ661N seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
Canada, Population at Beginning of the Quarter,
(CNPOPTOTP), Timespan: Q1 1950 - Q1 2019
Quarterly CANSIM - Statistics Canada [acquired from DataStream],
Adjustment Volumes
seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
GDP Implicit Price Deflator
in Canada, Index 2015=100
Quarterly CANGDPDEFQISMEI https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CANGDPDEFQISMEI Seasonally Adjusted
Table A.2: Canada data sources
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Variables Frequency Code Source Comment
Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in
Constant Prices: Total Gross Domestic
Product for Mexico, National Currency
Quarterly NAEXKP01MXQ189S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NAEXKP01MXQ189S Seasonally Adjusted
Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in
Constant Prices: Private Final
Consumption Expenditure for Mexico, National Currency
Quarterly NAEXKP02MXQ189S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NAEXKP02MXQ189S Seasonally Adjusted
Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in
Constant Prices: Gross Fixed Capital
Formation for Mexico, National Currency
Quarterly NAEXKP04MXQ189S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NAEXKP04MXQ189S Seasonally Adjusted
Mexico, Component Series, Official Discount Rate,
Original Series, CLI Central Bank Policy Rate (EOP),
MXOL2086R, Timespan: Aug 1975 - Feb 2019
Quarterly MXOL2086R Main Economic Indicators,
OECD [acquired from DataStream]
Not Seasonally Adjusted
National Currency to US Dollar Exchange Rate:
Average of Daily Rates for Mexico,
National Currency Units per US Dollar
Quarterly CCUSMA02MXQ618N https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CCUSMA02MXQ618N Not Seasonally Adjusted
Mexico, Terms of Trade, Total,
Index, 1980 = 100,
Timespan: Jan 1970- Feb 2019
Quarterly MXTOTPRCF Banco de Mexico [acquired from DataStream],
Adjustment Price index, not seasonally adjusted
seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
Global price of Brent Crude, U.S. Dollars per Barrell POILBREUSDM https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/POILBREUSDM seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
Consumer Price Index: Total All Items for the United States,
Index 2015=100
Quarterly CPALTT01USQ661S https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPALTT01USQ661S Seasonally adjusted
Consumer Price Index:
All Items for Mexico, Index 2015=100
Quarterly MEXCPIALLQINMEI https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEXCPIALLQINMEI seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
Mexico, Population,
Timespan: Q1 1980 - Q4 2049 (Forecast from Q1 2016)
Quarterly MXXPOPT.P Oxford Economics, Adjustment Volumes seasonal adjustment done
using the Eviews’ X-12 filter
GDP Implicit Price Deflator
in Mexico, Index 2015=100
Quarterly MEXGDPDEFQISMEI https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEXGDPDEFQISMEI Seasonally Adjusted
Table A.3: Mexico data sources
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a.10 chapter 2: calibration
To characterise the two countries that we studying closely we have calibrated some
of the parameters using specific/localized averaged data from these countries. We
especially focused on the following parameters:
The particularity of these targets make it difficult to pin down the exact value
and sometimes not easy to find the right series for the target.
G.1. Trade targets
We are calibrating share of the trade targets using two time-series (i.e. World
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data and GDP from the World Bank data).
The first one is trade data that contain many trade variables (i.e. table 1 shows
the various products available). We use four categories to pin the three targets
(namely: Share of consumer goods in export, Share of investment goods in exports,
and Share of Intermediate goods in exports (as % of GDP)). The select of these
categories make sense given that they represent more than 95% of the share of
exports and imports in both countries (table 2 shows this). We added the value of
the intermediate goods to the GDP (i.e. the total value of intermediate goods in
exports and imports) before dividing the different shares by this new value (what
we called ‘Y+’)
G.2. Oil targets
G.2.1 share of oil production (as % of GDP)
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Figure A.24: Table shows the various products available(Average over the period be-
tween 1993 and 2017)
Figure A.25: Table shows the Product Share (%) of different products in imports and
exports. Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
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On the oil targets, we calibrate share of oil production (as % of GDP). The way
this is computed is as an average oil production multiply by oil price and then
divided by GDP. This gives the below values for Canada and Mexico accordingly:
The data source for this is from the following: statista.com for the average oil
production in both countries and Federal Reserve Economic Data for the average
global oil prices. This can be revised given that oil production data acquired from
statista.com is limited to the period 1998 to 2017 for Canada and from 2005 to
2017 for Mexico.
G.2.2 Tax on oil production
This is one of the targets that are not easy to get data on (given the complexity
of the tax system and having multiple taxes (Royalties, Corporate income tax,
and Province tax etc.). We used Corporate income tax as a proxy for this.we
adopted the values from Ernst and Young 2019 Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide.
https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide—country-
list
G.3. Government Spending targets
For this, we used the General government final consumption expenditure (current
US dollar) divided by GDP. The data source is the World Bank.
G.4. Labour Share targets
We have obtained the average of the share of Labour Compensation in GDP
at Current National Prices as a proxy for this target. This data-series is from
Federal Reserve Economic Data and gives the following:
G.5. Intermediate inputs in the production
For this we find that papers in the literature that address this share
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refer to certain databases that include the following: - World Input-
Output: http://www.wiod.org/home - EU KLEMS Growth and Productiv-
ity Accounts: http://www.euklems.net/ - Global Trade Analysis Project:
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/default.asp Some papers men-
tioned that the average in OECD countries is 50%. In statistic Canada site, it
provides the following values: Both updated Casas et al. (2018) paper and John-
son (2011) calibrated the share of intermediate inputs in production to around 2/3
( 66%). Bergholt (2015) paper, calibrated Materials share to 37% and 35% for the
Canada and the US respectively while it cliabrated materials share for manufac-
turing in Norway to 50% (Bergholt and Larsen (2016)). One way to deal with this
is to follow the assumption that intermediate inputs represent 50% of the inputs
in the production function in all the countries, labour to represent certain % of
the remaining 50% (based of labour share value we have obtained).
G.6. Rule-of-thumb Consumers
This is an assumption that assumes there are two type of households in these
models; one type is an agents who has access to financial markets and a second
who faces a liquidity constrained. Many of the previous papers and literature
follows Campbell and Mankiw (1989) paper which assumes that 50% of US HHs
are liquidity constrained. Other cited a lower value for the US which varies from
16% to 33%. The table below summaries the main values that are mentioned in
the literature for the US and other countries:
Based on the above we have calibrated the countries in our model as of the
following:
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a.11 chapter 2: estimation results-
mexico-pcp
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Log data density is -2196.046506.
parameters prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
rho_a3 0.500 0.0435 0.0403 0.0476 beta 0.2000
rho_ms3 0.500 0.1910 0.1899 0.1925 beta 0.2000
rho_g3 0.500 0.6646 0.6625 0.6668 beta 0.2000
rho_IS3 0.500 0.5355 0.5315 0.5402 beta 0.2000
rho_tot32 0.500 0.5066 0.5064 0.5069 beta 0.2000
phiI3 2.000 2.7166 2.7128 2.7208 norm 1.5000
xi3 0.750 0.4394 0.4383 0.4407 beta 0.0500
siggma3 2.000 3.0417 3.0377 3.0451 norm 0.2500
chi3 0.700 0.7020 0.7019 0.7021 beta 0.1000
theta_pi3 1.500 3.0890 3.0873 3.0903 norm 0.2500
lambda3 0.400 0.3591 0.3589 0.3593 norm 0.0500
gammap3 0.500 0.9936 0.9903 0.9960 beta 0.1500
rho_r3 0.700 0.5898 0.5892 0.5905 beta 0.1000
theta_y3 0.100 0.0137 0.0132 0.0143 norm 0.0500
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theta_dy3 0.100 0.2137 0.2127 0.2154 norm 0.0500
theta_ds3 0.100 0.0454 0.0447 0.0461 norm 0.0500
zzeta3 7.000 15.3050 15.2510 15.3474 norm 2.5000
alp3 0.500 0.2992 0.2986 0.2998 beta 0.0500
alpM3 0.300 0.2815 0.2813 0.2816 beta 0.0500
standard deviation of shocks
prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
eps_a3 0.100 0.7063 0.6985 0.7178 invg 2.0000
eps_m3 0.100 0.8792 0.8766 0.8815 invg 2.0000
eps_ms3 0.100 0.0266 0.0252 0.0277 invg 2.0000
eps_g3 0.100 6.4060 6.3786 6.4281 invg 2.0000
eps_IS3 0.100 3.1115 3.0557 3.1567 invg 2.0000
eps_tot32 0.100 4.4729 4.4637 4.4845 invg 2.0000
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mexico-dcp
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Log data density is -893.075043.
parameters prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
rho_a3 0.500 0.9016 0.8415 0.9617 beta 0.2000
rho_ms3 0.500 0.8034 0.7542 0.8562 beta 0.2000
rho_g3 0.500 0.4970 0.1730 0.8274 beta 0.2000
rho_IS3 0.500 0.5341 0.4066 0.6781 beta 0.2000
rho_tot32 0.500 0.8087 0.7348 0.8801 beta 0.2000
lambda3 0.400 0.4670 0.4377 0.4960 norm 0.0500
gammap3 0.500 0.8147 0.7088 0.9291 beta 0.1500
theta_y3 0.100 -0.0083 -0.0158 -0.0007 norm 0.0500
theta_dy3 0.100 0.1641 0.0964 0.2235 norm 0.0500
theta_ds3 0.100 0.1562 0.1132 0.2026 norm 0.0500
rho_r3 0.700 0.6809 0.6469 0.7159 beta 0.1000
theta_pi3 1.500 2.5556 2.3019 2.7903 norm 0.2500
xi3 0.750 0.5852 0.5428 0.6276 beta 0.1000
chi3 0.700 0.8988 0.8724 0.9266 beta 0.1000
phiI3 2.000 7.1227 5.9894 8.2723 norm 1.5000
alp3 0.500 0.4279 0.3731 0.4859 beta 0.0500
alpM3 0.300 0.1947 0.1453 0.2385 beta 0.0500
siggma3 2.000 2.3415 2.0727 2.6002 norm 0.2500
zzeta3 7.000 8.3704 5.3477 11.1070 norm 2.5000
standard deviation of shocks
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prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
eps_a3 0.100 1.6137 1.2595 1.9628 invg 2.0000
eps_m3 0.100 0.3633 0.3084 0.4174 invg 2.0000
eps_ms3 0.100 11.6675 8.7228 14.5321 invg 2.0000
eps_g3 0.100 0.0901 0.0241 0.1705 invg 2.0000
eps_IS3 0.100 10.0142 7.4530 12.4228 invg 2.0000
eps_tot32 0.100 3.0574 2.6478 3.4591 invg 2.0000
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canada-pcp
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Log data density is -30864.218345.
parameters prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
rho_a3 0.500 0.5009 0.5007 0.5012 beta 0.2000
rho_ms3 0.500 0.5769 0.5764 0.5774 beta 0.2000
rho_g3 0.500 0.4922 0.4920 0.4924 beta 0.2000
rho_IS3 0.500 0.5069 0.5065 0.5072 beta 0.2000
rho_tot32 0.500 0.5306 0.5303 0.5310 beta 0.2000
phiI3 2.000 1.9900 1.9898 1.9903 norm 1.5000
xi3 0.750 0.5166 0.5148 0.5184 beta 0.0500
siggma3 2.000 1.9777 1.9774 1.9779 norm 0.2500
chi3 0.700 0.6220 0.6215 0.6226 beta 0.1000
theta_pi3 1.500 1.5421 1.5418 1.5425 norm 0.2500
lambda3 0.230 0.2863 0.2859 0.2869 norm 0.0500
gammap3 0.500 0.4584 0.4580 0.4588 beta 0.1500
rho_r3 0.700 0.7536 0.7530 0.7540 beta 0.1000
theta_y3 0.100 0.0644 0.0642 0.0646 norm 0.0500
theta_dy3 0.100 0.0931 0.0929 0.0932 norm 0.0500
theta_ds3 0.100 0.1673 0.1666 0.1679 norm 0.0500
zzeta3 7.000 6.9784 6.9780 6.9785 norm 2.5000
alp3 0.500 0.6325 0.6317 0.6334 beta 0.0500
alpM3 0.300 0.2034 0.2026 0.2042 beta 0.0500
standard deviation of shocks
prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
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eps_a3 0.100 0.1542 0.1537 0.1547 invg 2.0000
eps_m3 0.100 0.0584 0.0580 0.0587 invg 2.0000
eps_ms3 0.100 0.3427 0.3412 0.3445 invg 2.0000
eps_g3 0.100 0.1343 0.1338 0.1348 invg 2.0000
eps_IS3 0.100 0.1374 0.1368 0.1381 invg 2.0000
eps_tot32 0.100 0.1648 0.1644 0.1653 invg 2.0000
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canada-dcp
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Log data density is -27312.775219.
parameters prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
rho_a3 0.500 0.3787 0.3776 0.3798 beta 0.2000
rho_ms3 0.500 0.5981 0.5970 0.5992 beta 0.2000
rho_g3 0.500 0.4972 0.4970 0.4973 beta 0.2000
rho_IS3 0.500 0.5250 0.5242 0.5261 beta 0.2000
rho_tot32 0.500 0.5622 0.5609 0.5634 beta 0.2000
lambda3 0.230 0.2357 0.2356 0.2357 norm 0.0500
gammap3 0.500 0.4380 0.4369 0.4391 beta 0.1500
theta_y3 0.100 0.0681 0.0677 0.0685 norm 0.0500
theta_dy3 0.100 0.0997 0.0996 0.0998 norm 0.0500
theta_ds3 0.100 0.0824 0.0821 0.0826 norm 0.0500
rho_r3 0.700 0.6841 0.6838 0.6843 beta 0.1000
theta_pi3 1.500 1.6144 1.6133 1.6154 norm 0.2500
xi3 0.750 0.6677 0.6669 0.6685 beta 0.1000
chi3 0.700 0.7659 0.7651 0.7668 beta 0.1000
phiI3 2.000 3.7746 3.7587 3.7899 norm 1.5000
alp3 0.500 0.5332 0.5328 0.5335 beta 0.0500
alpM3 0.300 0.2456 0.2451 0.2461 beta 0.0500
siggma3 2.000 1.7147 1.7107 1.7185 norm 0.2500
zzeta3 7.000 4.1145 4.0924 4.1364 norm 2.5000
standard deviation of shocks
prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
eps_a3 0.100 0.1162 0.1155 0.1167 invg 2.0000
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eps_m3 0.100 0.1059 0.1056 0.1063 invg 2.0000
eps_ms3 0.100 1.3814 1.3645 1.3977 invg 2.0000
eps_g3 0.100 0.0215 0.0199 0.0230 invg 2.0000
eps_IS3 0.100 0.7360 0.7274 0.7445 invg 2.0000
eps_tot32 0.100 0.0254 0.0246 0.0262 invg 2.0000
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Figure A.26: Identification Strength of Prior Mean, Canada- PCP case
a.16 chapter 2: multivariate conver-
gence check
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Figure A.27: Identification Strength of Prior Mean, Canada- DCP case
Figure A.28: Identification Strength of Prior Mean, Mexico- PCP case
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Figure A.29: Identification Strength of Prior Mean, Mexico- DCP case
Figure A.30: Multivariate Convergence Check, Mexico- PCP case, 100,000 draws
135
a.16 chapter 2: multivariate convergence check
Figure A.31: Multivariate Convergence Check, Mexico- DCP case, 100,000 draws
Figure A.32: Multivariate Convergence Check, Canada- PCP case, 100,000 draws
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Figure A.33: Multivariate Convergence Check, Canada- DCP case, 100,000 draws
137
a.17 chapter 2: parameters estimation
a.17 chapter 2: parameters estimation
Estimated Parameter Values Prior Posterior
Symbole Dist. (Mean,Std Dev) Mean 90% HPD Interval
Canada-DCP
Technology shock A IG 0.10, 2.00 0.1162 0.1155 , 0.1167
Markup shock MS IG 0.10, 2.00 1.3814 1.3645 , 1.3977
Terms of trade shock tot IG 0.10, 2.00 0.0254 0.0246 , 0.0262
Government shock G IG 0.10, 2.00 0.0215 0.0199 , 0.023
Monetary policy shock M IG 0.10, 2.00 0.1059 0.1056 , 0.1063
Technology shock persistence ρA β 0.5,0.20 0.3787 0.3776 , 0.3798
Markup shock persistence ρMS β 0.5,0.20 0.5981 0.597 , 0.5992
Terms of trade shock persistence ρtot β 0.5,0.20 0.5622 0.5609 , 0.5634
Government shock persistence ρG β 0.5,0.20 0.4972 0.497 , 0.4973
Share of non-Ricardian consumers λ N 0.23,0.05 0.2357 0.2356 , 0.2357
Labour share αh β 0.5,0.05 0.5332 0.5328 , 0.5335
Share of intermediate inputs αm β 0.3,0.05 0.2456 0.2451 , 0.2461
Consumption habit formation χ β 0.70,0.1 0.7659 0.7651 , 0.7668
Calvo price stickiness ξ β 0.75,0.1 0.6677 0.6669 , 0.6685
Price index γ β 0.50,0.15 0.438 0.4369 , 0.4391
Elasticity of Investment adjustment cost φI N 2.00,1.50 3.7746 3.7587 , 3.7899
Feedback from inflation θpi N 1.50,0.25 1.6144 1.6133 , 1.6154
Feedback from output θy N 0.10,0.05 0.0681 0.0677 , 0.0685
Feedback from output growth θdy N 0.10,0.05 0.0997 0.0996 , 0.0998
Feedback from exchange rate depreciation θds N 0.10,0.05 0.0824 0.0821 ,0.0826
Canada-PCP
Technology shock A IG 0.10, 2.00 0.1542 0.1537 , 0.1547
Markup shock MS IG 0.10, 2.00 0.3427 0.3412 , 0.3445
Terms of trade shock tot IG 0.10, 2.00 0.1648 0.1644 , 0.1653
Government shock G IG 0.10, 2.00 0.1343 0.1338 , 0.1348
Monetary policy shock M IG 0.10, 2.00 0.0584 0.058 , 0.0587
Technology shock persistence ρA β 0.5,0.20 0.5009 0.5007 , 0.5012
Markup shock persistence ρMS β 0.5,0.20 0.5769 0.5764 , 0.5774
Terms of trade shock persistence ρtot β 0.5,0.20 0.5306 0.5303 , 0.531
Government shock persistence ρG β 0.5,0.20 0.4922 0.492 , 0.4924
Share of non-Ricardian consumers λ N 0.23,0.05 0.2863 0.2859 , 0.2869
Labour share αh β 0.5,0.05 0.6325 0.6317 , 0.6334
Share of intermediate inputs αm β 0.3,0.05 0.2034 0.2026 , 0.2042
Consumption habit formation χ β 0.70,0.1 0.622 0.6215 , 0.6226
Calvo price stickiness ξ β 0.75,0.1 0.5166 0.5148 , 0.5184
Price index γ β 0.50,0.15 0.4584 0.458 , 0.4588
Elasticity of Investment adjustment cost φI N 2.00,1.50 1.99 1.9898 , 1.9903
Feedback from inflation θpi N 1.50,0.25 1.5421 1.5418 , 1.5425
Feedback from output θy N 0.10,0.05 0.0644 0.0642 , 0.0646
Feedback from output growth θdy N 0.10,0.05 0.0931 0.0929 , 0.0932
Feedback from exchange rate depreciation θds N 0.10,0.05 0.1673 0.1666 ,0.1679
Table A.4: Estimated Parameter Values & Estimated standard deviation of shocks
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Estimated Parameter Values Prior Posterior
Symbole Dist. (Mean,Std Dev) Mean 90% HPD Interval
Mexico-DCP
Technology shock A IG 0.10, 2.00 1.6137 1.2595 , 1.9628
Markup shock MS IG 0.10, 2.00 11.6675 8.7228 , 14.5321
Terms of trade shock tot IG 0.10, 2.00 3.0574 2.6478 , 3.4591
Government shock G IG 0.10, 2.00 0.0901 0.0241 , 0.1705
Monetary policy shock M IG 0.10, 2.00 0.3633 0.3084 , 0.4174
Technology shock persistence ρA β 0.5,0.20 0.9016 0.8415 , 0.9617
Markup shock persistence ρMS β 0.5,0.20 0.8034 0.7542 , 0.8562
Terms of trade shock persistence ρtot β 0.5,0.20 0.8087 0.7348 , 0.8801
Government shock persistence ρG β 0.5,0.20 0.497 0.173 , 0.8274
Share of non-Ricardian consumers λ N 0.23,0.05 0.467 0.4377 , 0.496
Labour share αh β 0.5,0.05 0.4279 0.3731 , 0.4859
Share of intermediate inputs αm β 0.3,0.05 0.1947 0.1453 , 0.2385
Consumption habit formation χ β 0.70,0.1 0.8988 0.8724 , 0.9266
Calvo price stickiness ξ β 0.75,0.1 0.5852 0.5428 , 0.6276
Price index γ β 0.50,0.15 0.8147 0.7088 , 0.9291
Elasticity of Investment adjustment cost φI N 2.00,1.50 7.1227 5.9894 , 8.2723
Feedback from inflation θpi N 1.50,0.25 2.5556 2.3019 , 2.7903
Feedback from output θy N 0.10,0.05 -0.0083 -0.0158 , -0.0007
Feedback from output growth θdy N 0.10,0.05 0.1641 0.0964 , 0.2235
Feedback from exchange rate depreciation θds N 0.10,0.05 0.1562 0.1132 ,0.2026
Mexico-PCP
Technology shock A IG 0.10, 2.00 0.7063 0.6985 , 0.7178
Markup shock MS IG 0.10, 2.00 0.0266 0.0252 , 0.0277
Terms of trade shock tot IG 0.10, 2.00 4.4729 4.4637 , 4.4845
Government shock G IG 0.10, 2.00 6.406 6.3786 , 6.4281
Monetary policy shock M IG 0.10, 2.00 0.8792 0.8766 , 0.8815
Technology shock persistence ρA β 0.5,0.20 0.0435 0.0403 , 0.0476
Markup shock persistence ρMS β 0.5,0.20 0.191 0.1899 , 0.1925
Terms of trade shock persistence ρtot β 0.5,0.20 0.5066 0.5064 , 0.5069
Government shock persistence ρG β 0.5,0.20 0.6646 0.6625 , 0.6668
Share of non-Ricardian consumers λ N 0.23,0.05 0.3591 0.3589 , 0.3593
Labour share αh β 0.5,0.05 0.2992 0.2986 , 0.2998
Share of intermediate inputs αm β 0.3,0.05 0.2815 0.2813 , 0.2816
Consumption habit formation χ β 0.70,0.1 0.702 0.7019 , 0.7021
Calvo price stickiness ξ β 0.75,0.1 0.4394 0.4383 , 0.4407
Price index γ β 0.50,0.15 0.9936 0.9903 , 0.996
Elasticity of Investment adjustment cost φI N 2.00,1.50 2.7166 2.7128 , 2.7208
Feedback from inflation θpi N 1.50,0.25 3.089 3.0873 , 3.0903
Feedback from output θy N 0.10,0.05 0.0137 0.0132 , 0.0143
Feedback from output growth θdy N 0.10,0.05 0.2137 0.2127 , 0.2154
Feedback from exchange rate depreciation θds N 0.10,0.05 0.0454 0.0447 ,0.0461
Table A.5: Estimated Parameter Values & Estimated standard deviation of shocks
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Estimated Parameter Values Prior Posterior
Symbole Dist. (Mean,Std Dev) Mean 90% HPD Interval
ROW
Foreign Technology shock A∗ IG 0.10, 2.00 2.1058 1.28 , 2.753
Foreign Markup shock MS∗ IG 0.10, 2.00 3.0319 2.2407 , 3.7792
Foreign Government shock G∗ IG 0.10, 2.00 2.0738 1.8409 , 2.3223
Foreign Monetary policy shock M∗ IG 0.10, 2.00 0.1897 0.168 , 0.2111
Technology shock persistence ρA∗ β 0.50,0.10 0.1822 0.0754 , 0.3239
Markup shock persistence ρMS∗ β 0.50,0.10 0.7422 0.6384 , 0.8531
Government shock persistence ρIS∗ β 0.50,0.10 0.8068 0.6886 , 0.9307
Share of non-Ricardian consumers λ∗ N 0.50,0.05 0.285 0.2291 , 0.348
Labour share αh∗ β 0.5,0.05 0.4345 0.3957 , 0.4696
Share of intermediate inputs αm∗ β 0.3,0.05 0.3959 0.3306 , 0.463
Consumption habit formation χ∗ β 0.70,0.05 0.8283 0.7746 , 0.8745
Calvo price stickiness ξ∗ β 0.50,0.05 0.855 0.8322 , 0.8747
Elasticity of demand ζ∗ N 7.00,2.50 4.575 2.5011 , 8.6268
Price index γ∗ β 0.50,0.10 0.1685 0.0595 , 0.2857
Elasticity of Investment adjustment cost φI∗ N 2.00,1.50 5.788 4.2762 , 7.4892
Non-Ricardian risk aversion σc∗ N 2.00,0.25 1.5757 1.1748 , 1.9577
Feedback from inflation θpi∗ N 1.50,0.25 1.8593 1.6285 , 2.0595
Feedback from output θy∗ N 0.1,0.05 0.0126 -0.0095 , 0.0468
Feedback from output growth θdy∗ N 0.1,0.05 0.1482 0.085 , 0.2159
Table A.6: Estimated Parameter Values & Estimated standard deviation of shocks
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a.18 chapter 2: selected second mo-
ments
Figure A.34: Autocorrelations of Observables in the Actual Data and in the Estimated
Models- Mexico
Output Inflation Interest rate Consumption Investment Exchange Rate
Standard Deviation
Data 1.3752 2.2894 2.7377 1.3969 4.9496 6.8003
PCP Model 2.6643 2.4221 4.2243 1.8867 5.7643 8.2671
DCP Model 2.1172 1.6208 2.4919 2.455 4.133 9.6992
Cross-correlation with Output
Data 1.00 -0.2244 -0.1814 0.8252 0.8111 -0.4064
PCP Model 1.00 0.5671 0.1736 0.5164 -0.3776 0.4638
DCP Model 1.00 0.4102 0.1281 0.5939 0.0643 0.5451
Autocorrelations (Order=1)
Data 0.3982 0.8162 0.8855 0.3584 0.3845 0.1178
PCP Model -0.2929 0.1695 0.6072 0.2002 0.4519 0.0618
DCP Model 0.2624 0.1716 0.7178 0.6496 0.5716 -0.0921
Table A.7: Selected Second Moments of the Mexico Model
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Figure A.35: Autocorrelations of Observables in the Actual Data and in the Estimated
Models- Canada
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Output Inflation Interest rate Consumption Investment Exchange Rate
Standard Deviation
Data 0.6272 0.3947 0.4913 0.4777 2.0061 3.3746
PCP Model 3.4733 1.818 1.6022 0.6228 12.1896 10.2137
DCP Model 0.9297 1.7659 1.5427 0.8094 5.9386 11.1445
Cross-correlation with Output
Data 1.00 0.2174 0.1886 0.3609 0.5814 -0.0996
PCP Model 1.00 0.8769 0.2911 -0.0092 -0.4336 0.9038
DCP Model 1.00 0.556 0.3419 -0.2371 -0.4058 0.6611
Autocorrelations (Order=1)
Data 0.5033 0.1003 0.9471 0.209 0.4836 0.2637
PCP Model -0.1665 0.0068 0.6465 0.7018 0.562 -0.11
DCP Model 0.0879 0.0349 0.641 0.4065 0.5576 -0.0971
Table A.8: Selected Second Moments of the Canada Model
Figure A.36: IRFs- Monetary Policy shock- Canada
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Figure A.37: IRFs- Monetary Policy shock- Mexico
Figure A.38: IRFs- Monetary Policy shock- PCP Case
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Figure A.39: IRFs- Monetary Policy shock- DCP Case
a.19 chapter 2: variance decomposition
eps_a3 eps_g3 eps_ms3 eps_m3 eps_tot32 eps_IS3 eps_co eps_a2 eps_g2 eps_ms2 eps_m2 eps_IS2
y_obs 0.02 0.00 14.53 0.37 0.02 0.05 5.09 18.44 3.04 0.00 56.32 2.11
c_obs 0.02 0.00 15.25 0.53 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.37 0.09 0.00 82.18 1.21
i_obs 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.00 97.79 1.40
pi_obs 0.01 0.00 4.77 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.00 92.99 1.85
rn_obs 0.01 0.00 5.27 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.29 0.00 89.84 4.24
er_obs 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 99.74 0.06
Table A.9: Canada DCP-Variance Decomposition (in percent)
eps_a3 eps_g3 eps_ms3 eps_m3 eps_tot32 eps_IS3 eps_co eps_a2 eps_g2 eps_ms2 eps_m2 eps_IS2
y_obs 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.36 1.35 0.28 0.00 97.67 0.11
c_obs 0.29 0.04 3.89 0.87 0.13 0.00 1.04 2.46 0.26 0.00 89.63 1.38
i_obs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.00 98.94 0.82
pi_obs 0.07 0.01 0.35 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.00 97.89 1.14
rn_obs 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.30 0.00 96.75 2.61
er_obs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 99.93 0.03
Table A.10: Canada PCP-Variance Decomposition (in percent)
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eps_a3 eps_g3 eps_ms3 eps_m3 eps_tot32 eps_IS3 eps_co eps_a2 eps_g2 eps_ms2 eps_m2 eps_IS2
y_obs 5.18 0.00 37.71 0.05 11.41 1.00 3.79 0.23 0.10 0.00 40.36 0.18
c_obs 1.36 0.00 86.43 0.58 7.12 0.26 0.25 0.11 0.01 0.00 3.82 0.06
i_obs 1.11 0.00 19.72 0.00 5.54 35.33 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.00 36.73 1.38
pi_obs 1.96 0.00 7.55 3.33 12.42 0.73 0.01 0.24 0.11 0.00 73.29 0.37
rn_obs 0.97 0.00 1.69 0.16 7.68 1.24 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.00 87.42 0.58
er_obs 0.39 0.00 0.65 0.26 2.45 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 96.02 0.10
Table A.11: Mexico DCP-Variance Decomposition (in percent)
eps_a3 eps_g3 eps_ms3 eps_m3 eps_tot32 eps_IS3 eps_co eps_a2 eps_g2 eps_ms2 eps_m2 eps_IS2
y_obs 0.71 1.56 0.00 1.31 24.68 0.22 5.20 0.18 0.05 0.00 65.97 0.11
c_obs 0.55 17.68 0.00 5.68 35.48 0.19 2.59 0.14 0.04 0.00 37.50 0.13
i_obs 0.01 0.74 0.00 0.01 7.03 8.14 0.01 0.04 0.26 0.00 82.06 1.70
pi_obs 0.18 1.14 0.00 5.18 9.24 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.00 83.94 0.08
rn_obs 0.08 1.04 0.00 0.13 9.16 0.26 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 89.08 0.12
er_obs 0.04 0.72 0.00 0.82 5.92 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 92.20 0.14
Table A.12: Mexico PCP-Variance Decomposition (in percent)
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Figure A.40: IRFs of UK variables to a 1%p increase in the US government spending
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Figure A.42: IRFs of Canada variables to a 1%p increase in the US government spending
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Figure A.44: IRFs of UK variables to a 1%p decrease in the US tax revenue
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Figure A.46: IRFs of Canada variables to a 1%p decrease in the US tax revenue
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Figure A.48: IRFs of the UK and Canada variables to a 1%p increase in the US govern-
ment spending – All-IV case only
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Figure A.50: IRFs of the UK and Canada variables to a 1%p decrease in the US tax
revenue – All-IV case only
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(%p)
(Quarters)
US Tax revenue growth  
UK
Canada
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(%p)
(Quarters)
GDP growth
UK
Canada
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(%p)
(Quarters)
CPI inflation rate
UK
Canada -2
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(%p)
(Quarters)
TB-to-GDP ratio
UK
Canada
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(%p)
(Quarters)
Exchange rate
UK
Canada
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(%p)
(Quarters)
Differential in interest rate spreads
UK
Canada
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(%p)
(Quarters)
Stock price index growth
UK
Canada
153
